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Hybridizing Jurisdiction
Scott Dodson*
Federal jurisdiction—the “power” of the court—is seen as
something separate and unique, with a litany of special effects that
define jurisdictionality as the antipode of nonjurisdictionality. The
resulting conceptualization is that jurisdictionality and nonjurisdictionality occupy mutually exclusive theoretical and doctrinal space.
In a recent Article, I refuted this rigid dichotomy of jurisdictionality
and nonjurisdictionality by explaining that nonjurisdictional rules
can be “hybridized” with any—or even all—of the attributes of
jurisdictionality.
This Article drops the other shoe. Jurisdictional rules can be
hybridized, too, and in myriad forms. The result is a far more
complex world than what the simple—but fallacious—dichotomy of
jurisdictionality and nonjurisdictionality suggests.
Hybridization enables parties and courts to regulate federal
jurisdiction in normatively desirable ways. Court control may reestablish power to inject considerations of fairness into jurisdictional
issues. Party control may alleviate some of the costs of
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jurisdictionality. Further, hybridization can achieve these regulatory
rewards while simultaneously retaining a healthy, formal distinction
between jurisdictionality and nonjurisdictionality. The result is a
cleaner, truer, and more useful conceptualization of jurisdiction.
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INTRODUCTION
As every first-year U.S. law student learns, federal subject-matter
jurisdiction is something separate, special, and unique. Nowhere is that lesson
driven home more forcefully than in the ancient but oft-assigned case of
Capron v. Van Noorden.1 There, a plaintiff brought a diversity action in federal
1.

6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126 (1804).
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court and lost at trial on the merits. The plaintiff then appealed, citing his own
failure to allege diversity of citizenship properly. The Supreme Court agreed
and vacated the judgment against the plaintiff for lack of jurisdiction, even
though it was the plaintiff who invoked that jurisdiction in the first place.2
Capron suggests that federal subject-matter jurisdiction is different in
kind from other requirements of substance and procedure. Jurisdiction, it is
said, is the “power” of the court.3 As such, and generally unlike matters of
procedure or substance, jurisdiction carries with it a standard set of effects: It
cannot be consented to; jurisdictional defects cannot be waived, forfeited, or
excused for equitable reasons, and they may be raised by any party any time
before final judgment; judgments entered without jurisdiction are void; and the
court has an obligation to assure itself of its own jurisdiction at all times.4
By most accounts, these are uniformly held, well-established, and
uncontroversial principles. Courts and commentators reiterate these principles
with a certitude that shuns hesitation or question.5 Their repetition has
entrenched the idea of jurisdiction as a rigid antipode to nonjurisdictional law,
such as procedural rules and substantive elements. A court either has
jurisdiction or does not, and, when it does not, there is nothing to do but
dismiss the case.6
I aim to shake things up a bit. In previous work, I have attempted to refute
the rigid dichotomy of jurisdictionality and nonjurisdictionality by explaining
that a nonjurisdictional rule can have any—or even all—of the attributes of
jurisdictionality.7 Such hybridized nonjurisdictional rules have their own
salutary role to play in legal regimes by permitting nonjurisdictional rules and
doctrines to have a broad range of effects that better implement the rules’
norms and goals. One example is state sovereign immunity, which could be
cast as a mandatory but nonjurisdictional rule that the defendant can waive but
that, like a jurisdictional rule, the court has no discretion to refuse to apply once
properly invoked.8
That nonjurisdictional rules can have jurisdictional effects causes these
two categories to collide and erodes the antipodal definition of jurisdictionality
as altogether different from nonjurisdictionality. Hybridizing nonjurisdictionality with jurisdictional effects undermines jurisdictionality’s separate sphere of
uniqueness and raises the question whether jurisdictionality may be subject to a
similar hybridization.
2. Id. at 126–27.
3. See infra note 18.
4. See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (setting
out characteristics of subject-matter jurisdiction).
5. See infra notes 18–24.
6. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868).
7. See Scott Dodson, Mandatory Rules, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2008).
8. See id. at 15–33. I am not wedded to this characterization. Indeed, I propose a countercharacterization of state sovereign immunity in Part III of this Article.
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This Article offers an answer: jurisdictional rules can have features of
nonjurisdictionality, too. Hybridization offers more accurate ways of conceptualizing doctrines that are otherwise difficult to place in the jurisdictionalnonjurisdictional dichotomy. Further, by circumscribing jurisdiction and
incorporating more judicial and party control, hybridization can reduce the
costliness of jurisdiction. Finally, hybridization can achieve all this while
retaining a healthy, formal distinction between jurisdictionality and
nonjurisdictionality.9
A closer look at Capron gives a preview of how jurisdiction can be
hybridized. Note that whether diversity of citizenship actually existed in Capron
was unclear. The problem was that the plaintiff failed to allege diversity of
citizenship, and the record in the lower court showed no evidence of diversity of
citizenship.10 But none of that means that diversity of citizenship did not in fact
exist. For all the Supreme Court knew, the two parties might actually have had
diverse citizenships, giving the lower court proper jurisdiction.
That possibility was of little concern because the Supreme Court relied on
a rule that was different from—indeed, was irrelevant to—the question of
whether diversity of citizenship actually existed. Instead, the Court’s rule was
that federal trial courts lack jurisdiction “unless the record shews that the
parties are citizens of different states.”11 That rule relegates jurisdictionality to
a question of proof not unlike that required for substantive elements of a claim.
Perhaps it makes sense that the actual presence of diverse parties is a
jurisdictional requirement. But that does not mean that the test for, and
mechanisms of, proving diversity of citizenship are also jurisdictional
requirements. One might, instead, consider whether such tests and mechanisms
should be amenable to typical nonjurisdictional features, such as equitable
estoppel, waiver, and forfeiture. Those nonjurisdictional features might then
affect the ultimate jurisdictional determination.
Divorcing the core question of federal jurisdiction from its nonjurisdictional mode of proof may seem strange today, but, historically, a party
waived its objection to the lack of jurisdiction in federal court by failing to
follow proper procedure. In Capron’s time, a defendant waived any objections
to subject-matter jurisdiction by filing an answer instead of a plea in
abatement.12 Parties could concoct federal jurisdiction by pleading and not
9. Because my broader thesis is that jurisdictionality and nonjurisdictionality can be blended,
there is some irony in my attempt to continue to use these terms with a meaning linked to their
traditional definitions. I will have more to say about that in the Conclusion, but my excuse for now is
that the lexicon is not yet big enough to differentiate various hybridizations with single monikers. I
hope that phrases like “jurisdictional yet subject to judicial discretion” might be understandable
enough.
10. Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126, 126 (1804).
11. Id.
12. See Michael G. Collins, Jurisdictional Exceptionalism, 93 VA. L. REV. 1829, 1839–40
(2007).
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objecting to the jurisdictional requirements, even if the parties’ allegations
contradicted factual reality.13 Parties could admit jurisdictional facts.14 As a
result, many cases were litigated and decided by federal courts that otherwise
lacked jurisdiction to do so.15
Things are different now,16 but, as I will argue, they are far less different
than conventionally thought. Even today, federal law often links jurisdiction to
nonjurisdictional procedures. Some jurisdictional doctrines and statutes
incorporate nonjurisdictional features inherently or expressly. Nonjurisdictional
timing rules can control the temporal scope of jurisdictional decision making.
Jurisdictional questions can depend upon nonjurisdictional preconditions. Rules
of proof can regulate jurisdictional fact-finding. In each of these cases,
jurisdictional rules are hybridized with nonjurisdictional rules or features. The
result is a far more complex world than what the oversimplified dichotomy of
jurisdictionality and nonjurisdictionality suggests.
Hybridization, then, offers a cleaner and more accurate picture of the
relationship between jurisdictionality and nonjurisdictionality. Doctrines such
as personal jurisdiction, sovereign immunity, mootness, and discretionary
declination of jurisdiction do not fit comfortably into either one exclusively;
rather, they all have features of both jurisdictionality and nonjurisdictionality.
By reconceptualizing the jurisdictionality-nonjurisdictionality relationship,
hybridization more accurately explains how these doctrines function.
Hybridization begets regulation. Hybridizing jurisdictionality with nonjurisdictionality can, in effect, confine jurisdictional determinations to specified
circumstances and conditions. In some cases, the federal courts may regulate
jurisdiction through the exercise of judicial discretion or consideration of
equitable circumstances. In other cases, the parties may regulate jurisdiction
through considerations of waiver, consent, or forfeiture.

13. Id. at 1838–39 (“Indeed, as discussed below, the parties could even collude to have their
case tried in federal court with a combination of a plaintiff’s proper jurisdictional plea and a
defendant’s non-objection.”); id. at 1877 (“The [common law] encouraged gaming of the system to
secure jurisdiction when it did not—under some alternative set of proofs—really exist. . . . The result
was that federal courts continued to hear cases even when it became clear that jurisdiction may have
been lacking in fact, or even concocted.”).
14. See Dan B. Dobbs, Beyond Bootstrap: Foreclosing the Issue of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Before Final Judgment, 51 MINN. L. REV. 491, 511 (1967).
15. See Collins, supra note 12, at 1832–33 (“Emphasis on the pleadings, when coupled with
limited procedural opportunities to go behind the narrowly construed record, carried with it the
possibility—often realized—that cases outside of Article III or Congress’s implementing statutes
would be heard by the federal courts.”). At a minimum, however, as Capron itself suggests, the party
seeking federal jurisdiction would have to properly invoke it.
16. Compare United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) (“[An] elastic concept of
jurisdiction is not what the term ‘jurisdiction’ means today, e.g., the courts’ statutory or constitutional
power to adjudicate the case.”) (internal quotation marks omitted), with infra text accompanying notes
70–81 (describing the more elastic historical concept).
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Jurisdictional regulatability is antithetical to the modern conception of
jurisdiction as largely independent of party or court control. But that conception
is theoretically and descriptively wrong. And jurisdictional regulatability has
the potential to be normatively desirable. Increased court control may
reestablish the power to impose considerations of fairness onto jurisdictional
issues. Increased party control may alleviate some of the costs of jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction can, and perhaps should, be regulable through hybridization.
At the same time, I am not yet prepared to banish jurisdiction entirely.
Jurisdiction can play important structural, expressive, and psychological roles.
Hybridization, by focusing rather than eliminating jurisdictionality, also helps
to reaffirm it. Hybridization, perhaps paradoxically, both connects and
distinguishes jurisdictionality and nonjurisdictionality, and, in the process, it
both softens and strengthens jurisdiction.
This Article explores the complex and understudied world of hybridized
jurisdiction. Part I situates my thesis in the broader literature of jurisdictionality. It shows how nonjurisdictional rules may be hybridized with jurisdictional features and theorizes how jurisdictional rules might be hybridized similarly.
Part II tells a descriptive story of hybridized jurisdictional rules as neither new
nor controversial nor particularly uncommon and develops an original
taxonomy to categorize and illustrate the various types of hybridized
jurisdictional rules in federal courts. Part III then analyzes the prescriptive
utility of the taxonomy in helping to classify ill-fitting doctrines in a more
accurate, hybridized way. Finally, Part IV offers a normative account of
hybridized jurisdictional rules by focusing on the beneficial regulatory power to
which hybridization can subject jurisdictional doctrine. I conclude with some
brief observations of the implications of my insights to the literature and
current federal doctrine.
I.
JURISDICTIONALITY AND NONJURISDICTIONALITY
This Part introduces jurisdictional theory and situates my thesis in the
broader literature of jurisdictionality. It shows how nonjurisdictional rules may
be hybridized with jurisdictional effects and theorizes how jurisdictional rules
might be hybridized similarly.
A. Traditional Conceptualization: A Rigid Dichotomy
The usual conceptualization of jurisdictionality and nonjurisdictionality is
that of separate spheres and mutually opposing characteristics—they are
antitheses of each other. As one commentator has put it, “[i]n modern Anglo-
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American legal doctrine, legal issues are either ‘jurisdictional’ or ‘nonjurisdictional.’”17
Jurisdiction is typically defined as the “power”18 or basic “authority”19 of
a federal court. It protects nonlitigant systemic values of federalism, separation
of powers, and judicial-resource allocation,20 which cannot be safeguarded
adequately by the parties or the court. Thus, jurisdiction typically is
characterized by a rigid set of effects that place it beyond the control of the
parties: A jurisdictional rule can be raised at any time, including for the first
time on appeal; it obligates the court to police compliance sua sponte; and it is
not subject to principles of equity, waiver, forfeiture, consent, or estoppel.21
Jurisdiction is “inflexible” and “without exception.”22 Without it, a court’s only
option is to dismiss.23 As one commentator has stated, “[s]o sanctified is
[jurisdiction’s] formula that a halo of constitutionality surrounds it.”24
By contrast, nonjurisdictionality is concerned with matters of substance
and procedure and can be subject to party and court control. Such control has
value. The parties can choose which rules are worth litigating and which are
not, thereby conserving resources for more important issues. The court can
inject fairness and equity if individualized circumstances call for them. As a
result, nonjurisdictional rules usually are defined as having all the inverse
effects of jurisdictionality—they can be waived, forfeited, or consented to, and
they are subject to equitable exceptions, estoppel, and judicial discretion.25

17. Perry Dane, Jurisdictionality, Time, and the Legal Imagination, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4
(1994). But cf. id. at 4 n.4 (acknowledging examples of “quasi-jurisdictional” or “almost jurisdictional”
issues); John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 135 (2008) (characterizing the
statute of limitations in the Tucker Act as a “more absolute” bar).
18. See Cotton, 535 U.S. at 630 (characterizing jurisdiction as “the courts’ statutory or
constitutional power to adjudicate the case”); McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1915)
(characterizing jurisdiction as “power”); Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868)
(“Jurisdiction is power to declare the law . . . .”); Lawrence Gene Sager, Constitutional Limitations on
Congress’ Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 22
(1981) (“The concept of subject-matter jurisdiction in our legal system refers to the motive force of a
court, the root power to adjudicate a specified set of controversies.”).
19. See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004) (referring to jurisdiction as “a court’s
adjudicatory authority”); Evan Tsen Lee, The Dubious Concept of Jurisdiction, 54 HASTINGS L.J.
1613, 1617 (2003) (rejecting a definition of “power” and instead characterizing jurisdiction as a facet
of “authority”).
20. See Scott Dodson, In Search of Removal Jurisdiction, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 55, 59 (2008)
(“As ‘power,’ jurisdiction embodies societal values, such as federalism, separation of powers, and a
limited national government.”).
21. See Dodson, supra note 7, at 4–5.
22. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 577 (1999); see also Mansfield,
Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884) (same).
23. See McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 514; Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 250
(1867) (“If there were no jurisdiction, then there was no power to do anything but to strike the case
from the docket.”).
24. Dan B. Dobbs, The Decline of Jurisdiction by Consent, 40 N.C. L. REV. 49, 49 (1961).
25. See Dodson, supra note 7, at 5.
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Courts and commentators often make this dichotomy between
jurisdictionality and nonjurisdictionality quite rigid and explicit, suggesting that
jurisdictionality and nonjurisdictionality are mutual opposites in both their
formal natures and their functional effects.26 The distinction between
jurisdictionality and nonjurisdictionality, as Perry Dane has written in the
context of time limits, “always rests on an explicit contrast. . . . [I]f [a rule] is
jurisdictional, the court will read it or treat it one way; if it is not jurisdictional,
the court will read it or treat it another way.”27
Indeed, the contrast is so stark that a court often will invoke the mantra of
jurisdictionality and imply that a defined set of effects inexorably flows from
the jurisdictional characterization without further analysis. For example, in Day
v. McDonough, the Supreme Court stated, “[a] statute of limitations defense . . .
is not ‘jurisdictional,’ hence courts are under no obligation to raise the time bar
sua sponte.”28 The Court’s assumption was that a certain defined set of
nonjurisdictional attributes necessarily follows from the nonjurisdictional
characterization. The converse assumptions flow from characterizations of
jurisdictionality.29 This logic is rampant among courts and commentators.30
Perhaps the most poignant recent illustration of the jurisdictionalitynonjurisdictionality dichotomy in action is the 2007 Supreme Court case of
Bowles v. Russell. There, Keith Bowles, convicted of murder in state court,
petitioned for a federal writ of habeas corpus, which the district court denied.31
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2107, Bowles had thirty days to appeal to the court of
appeals.32 Bowles failed to meet that deadline and, after it passed, asked the

26. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 12, at 1831 (“[J]urisdictional questions are exceptional [in
their ordering and effects] and escape the application of many ordinary principles that would be
applicable to the resolution of nonjurisdictional questions.”).
27. Dane, supra note 17, at 12.
28. Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205 (2006) (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 213
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We have repeatedly stated that the enactment of time-limitation periods such
as that in § 2244(d), without further elaboration, produces defenses that are nonjurisdictional and thus
subject to waiver and forfeiture.”).
29. See, e.g., Cook v. United States, 246 F. App’x 990, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[J]urisdictional
rules are mandatory; therefore, their time limits cannot be waived.”).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 242 F. App’x 209, 210 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam)
(“[T]ime limits not imposed by statute are not jurisdictional. The specific implication is that these time
limits may be waived.”) (citations omitted); Cook, 246 F. App’x at 994 (“[C]laim-processing rules are
not jurisdictional—thus, their time limits can be waived.”) (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted); E.
King Poor, Jurisdictional Deadlines in the Wake of Kontrick and Eberhart: Harmonizing 160 Years of
Precedent, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 181, 207 n.172 (2007) (“The importance of the distinction
[between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional characterizations] was that non-jurisdictional deadlines
are subject to equitable exceptions, described as ‘waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.’”) (quoting
Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982)).
31. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 207 (2007).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a) (2006).
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district court to reopen the deadline to appeal,33 as § 2107 allowed him to do.34
The district court granted Bowles’s motion on February 10, 2004.35
In its order, the district court specifically gave Bowles until February 27,
2004, to file his notice of appeal.36 Apparently, no one objected to the district
court’s order. Following the order, Bowles filed his notice of appeal on
February 26, sixteen days after his motion had been granted and within the time
allowed by the district court’s order.37 Unfortunately, 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) limits
reopened time periods to fourteen days.38 Thus, Bowles’s notice of appeal—
though timely under the district court’s order—was untimely under the statute.
The state immediately moved to dismiss Bowles’s appeal as untimely, and
the court of appeals granted the state’s motion. The Supreme Court affirmed,
holding § 2107(c) to be a jurisdictional rule.39 Because the rule was
jurisdictional, the Court explained, it barred the appeal even if the defect was
induced by the district court’s misleading order, and despite any unfairness or
inequity to Bowles.40
There is much to criticize about Bowles,41 but for my purposes, it helps to
illustrate the rigid division between jurisdictionality and nonjurisdictionality.
Once the Court held the rule to be jurisdictional, it assumed that the
jurisdictional effects automatically applied, and the underlying circumstances—
no matter how compelling—became irrelevant. The Court offered no analysis
of why; rather, it merely assumed the truth of its major premise: all
jurisdictional rules are immune from equitable exceptions.
The four justices in dissent adhered to the other side of the dichotomy.
They would have characterized the rule as nonjurisdictional.42 From that
conclusion, according to the dissent, it automatically followed that Bowles’s
equitable excuse was viable.43 There was some precedent justifying this

33. Bowles, 551 U.S. at 207.
34. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c).
35. Bowles, 551 U.S. at 207.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c).
39. Bowles, 551 U.S. at 214 (“Today we make clear that the timely filing of a notice of appeal
in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.”).
40. Id. at 213 (“And because Bowles’ error is one of jurisdictional magnitude, he cannot rely
on forfeiture or waiver to excuse his lack of compliance with the statute’s time limitations.”); id. at 214
(“Because this Court has no authority to create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements, use
of the ‘unique circumstances’ doctrine is illegitimate.”).
41. For some of that criticism, see Scott Dodson, The Failure of Bowles v. Russell, 43 TULSA
L. REV. 631 (2008), and Scott Dodson, Jurisdictionality and Bowles v. Russell, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 42 (2007), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/21/.
42. Bowles, 551 U.S. at 216–18 (Souter, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 216 (“While a mandatory but nonjurisdictional limit is enforceable at the insistence
of a party claiming its benefit or by a judge concerned with moving the docket, it may be waived or
mitigated in exercising reasonable equitable discretion.”).
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position,44 but the thrust of the dissenters’ argument was primarily based on a
major premise that was the antipode of the majority’s: all nonjurisdictional
rules are (at least presumptively) subject to equitable exceptions.
Bowles thus illustrates the customary conceptualization of jurisdictionality
and nonjurisdictionality as occupying mutually exclusive doctrinal space.
According to that conceptualization, if a rule is jurisdictional, it falls into one
basket with one defined set of effects; if it is nonjurisdictional, it falls into a
different basket with a defined set of inverse effects.45
B. Expanding Definitions: Hybridized Nonjurisdictional Rules
As I have argued elsewhere, this rigid dichotomy is false, at least from the
perspective of nonjurisdictional rules.46 In contrast to the conventional wisdom,
nothing inherent in the nature of nonjurisdictionality prevents nonjurisdictional
rules from having jurisdictional effects.47 Indeed, some nonjurisdictional rules
currently exhibit jurisdictional attributes. For example, certain rules of
bankruptcy procedure are nonjurisdictional yet may not be susceptible to party
consent, waiver, or forfeiture.48 Rules 33 and 45(b) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which provide a rigid deadline of seven days to file a
motion for a new trial, are nonjurisdictional, yet a court may not excuse
noncompliance with them for equitable reasons.49 In a federal habeas case, a
state cannot forfeit or be estopped from asserting the nonjurisdictional defense
44. See Thompson v. INS, 375 U.S. 384, 387 (1964) (per curiam) (reaffirming the “unique
circumstances” doctrine), overruled by Bowles, 551 U.S. at 214; Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry
Meat Packers, Inc., 371 U.S. 215, 217 (1962) (per curiam) (recognizing the “unique circumstances”
doctrine), overruled by Bowles, 551 U.S. at 214.
45. Recent cases suggest that the Court may be open to a more nuanced approach. In
Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197 (2011), the Court phrased the question presented as whether
the 120-day deadline at issue had “jurisdictional consequences.” That might be an implicit
acknowledgment that even a nonjurisdictional rule could have jurisdictional effects. However, the
Court did not pursue this possibility, instead falling back on the question whether the deadline is
jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional. Concluding that the deadline is nonjurisdictional, the Court stated
that it does not have jurisdictional attributes, but the Court did not explain why. It appears that the
Court simply fell back into the dichotomy. See Scott Dodson, Two Cheers for Henderson, CIVIL
PROCEDURE AND FED. COURTS BLOG (Mar. 2, 2011), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/2011/
03/commentary-two-cheers-for-henderson.html. In Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), the
Court held § 157(b)(5) of the Judicial Code to be nonjurisdictional and then engaged in a separate
(though relatively perfunctory) analysis as to whether the provision was waivable. The Court
concluded that it was waivable, however, and thus dropped the provision entirely into the
nonjurisdictional basket. Still, these cases suggest that the Court is becoming more receptive to
nuanced, as opposed to binary, characterizations.
46. See Dodson, supra note 7, at 6 (“This automatic characterization of nonjurisdictional rules
as the inverse of jurisdictional rules . . . is erroneous.”).
47. See id. (arguing that “nonjurisdictional rules are not inherently prohibited from having
jurisdictional effects”); see also Dane, supra note 17, at 39 (“[L]egal rules can be mandatory without
being jurisdictional.”).
48. Cf. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 457 n.12 (2004) (noting that a debtor and creditor may
not be able to consent to time-barred claims that would prejudice other creditors).
49. See Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19 (2005) (calling them “inflexible”).
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of exhaustion absent the state’s express waiver.50 Federal courts may, in
appropriate circumstances, raise certain nonjurisdictional defenses sua sponte
even if the defendant forfeited them.51
The conceptual dichotomy relegates these hybridized outliers to
exceptional status, but they have salutary roles to play in our justice system. As
an institutional matter, hybridization offers a broader range of available categorizations, from which the most appropriate effects can be selected and used.
Take, for example, a specific nonjurisdictional hybrid that I have called a
“mandatory rule.”52 A mandatory rule is a nonjurisdictional rule that can be
waived, forfeited, or consented to. But, when the rule is properly invoked, a
court has no discretion to excuse its noncompliance, even for compelling
equitable reasons.53 For example, the exhaustion requirement of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act—which states that “no action shall be brought with
respect to prison conditions under § 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law,
by a prisoner . . . until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted”54—is a mandatory but nonjurisdictional limit that can be waived but
is not subject to court discretion.55
Such a rule has benefits. Waiver, forfeiture, and consent allow the parties
to choose whether the rule is something worth litigating or not. These features
also allow intrasuit settlements—“I won’t challenge this deadline if you don’t
challenge that deadline.” They promote finality by ensuring that parties’
decisions not to challenge noncompliance will not later be raised by the court to
unravel months (or perhaps years) of litigation.56 And they can make a complex
litigation markedly simpler by disposing of many issues by consent.57
A mandatory rule’s immunity to discretion and equity also can have
virtues. Rigidity incentivizes compliance with the rule (or clarity in securing a
waiver of the rule from the other party). It also promotes finality and furthers
reliance interests if the opposing party is depending on the rule. Finally, it
fosters equality across cases by preventing case-specific equitable excuses and
conserves judicial resources by avoiding the need for courts to grapple with a
50. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3) (2006) (“A State shall not be deemed to have waived the
exhaustion requirement or be estopped from reliance upon the requirement unless the State, through
counsel, expressly waives the requirement.”).
51. See, e.g., Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 206–07 (2006) (referring to a habeas
petitioner’s procedural default under the nonjurisdictional independent and adequate state grounds
doctrine).
52. See Dodson, supra note 7, at 9.
53. See id. at 9–10. An example might be the sixty-day notification period of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1), which the Supreme Court has classified as
“mandatory” without resolving its jurisdictional status. See Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S.
20, 25–31 (1989).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
55. See Jones v. Block, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007).
56. See Dodson, supra note 7, at 10 (elaborating on these values).
57. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011) (recognizing this virtue of waiver).
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host of different equitable situations to determine whether and under what
circumstances noncompliance is justified.58 These features of mandatory rules
can be useful.
Mandatory rules have downsides—namely, that the equitable circumstances barred from consideration in a particular case might be extremely
compelling—but it seems indisputable that, in some areas of the law, the
virtues of rigidity can outweigh those of individual fairness. The hybridized
“mandatory rule” gives rule makers a tool to choose in those areas.
Hybridization of nonjurisdictional rules proves two points. The first is that
the dichotomy between nonjurisdictionality and jurisdictionality is not so rigid.
The second is that hybridization can have desirable effects, such as increasing
the diversity of options available for setting and enforcing legal norms.
C. New Frontiers: Hybridized Jurisdictional Rules
One might respond that hybridization makes sense for nonjurisdictional
rules but that hybridizing jurisdictional rules is another matter entirely. After
all, nonjurisdictionality lacks the formal identity of jurisdictionality as “power”
independent of party or court control. Thus, one might welcome hybridization
of nonjurisdictional rules yet be resistant to hybridization of jurisdictional rules.
This reaction is quite sensible in light of the modern conceptualization of
jurisdictionality as special, but it falters on three major fronts: theory, history,
and modern practice.
1. Theory
Jurisdiction is not, as a matter of theory, as special as the conventional
rhetoric makes it out to be. As Evan Tsen Lee has powerfully argued, there is
no inherent conceptual difference between jurisdictional doctrines and
nonjurisdictional issues such as merits59 (and perhaps procedure). Jurisdiction
cannot mean “power” in the descriptive sense, for a court has the ability to
enter a judgment that then could be enforced even if the court lacks subjectmatter jurisdiction.60 Instead, jurisdiction goes to the normative question of
legitimate authority.61 Jurisdiction, in other words, “denotes a presumption in
favor of the legitimacy of the prospective judgment.”62
But questions pertaining to the nonjurisdictional areas of merits and
procedure also speak to the legitimacy of the judgment. And all three
58. See Dodson, supra note 7, at 10 (explaining these virtues).
59. Lee, supra note 19, at 1614 (“[T]here is no hard conceptual difference between jurisdiction
and the merits.”).
60. Id. at 1616–17. Even if such a judgment would be void for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction, the issuing court still in fact entered a purportedly valid judgment that might still be
enforced.
61. Id. at 1617.
62. Id. at 1622.

01-Dodson (Do Not Delete)

2011]

11/7/2011 10:32 AM

HYBRIDIZING JURISDICTION

1451

categories—merits, procedure, and jurisdiction—speak to legitimacy in ways
that are difficult to distinguish from each other. It is true that one could
conceive of jurisdiction as “authority to decide” and merits as “authority to
decide in a particular way,”63 but, ultimately, both go to the authority and
legitimacy of the resulting judgment.
Consider, for example, the relative legitimacy of the following: A
judgment that is correct on the merits but rendered by a court that lacks
jurisdiction,64 a judgment that is incorrect on the merits but rendered by a court
that has jurisdiction,65 or a judgment that seems correct on the merits and
rendered by a court that has jurisdiction but resulted from a drastically flawed
procedure.66 Each scenario has its own illegitimacy (of the forum, of the
verdict, or of the process), and although those illegitimacies can be framed in
different ways, they implicate the same concern—namely, the acceptability of
the judgment. Consequently, there is no reason why a defect in jurisdiction
should cause any special illegitimacy.
To be sure, particular defects may justify particular effects, but they do
not hinge on generalized notions of “jurisdiction.” Thus, protection of statecourt authority, particularly when a state is not otherwise involved, might help
support the imposition of nonwaivable features for certain rules, including
jurisdictional rules. But not all jurisdictional rules further such a goal. And,
many nonjurisdictional rules are designed to serve values not adequately
protected by the parties.67 The inability to theorize a compelling distinction
between jurisdictionality and nonjurisdictionality erodes the special status that
jurisdictionality’s rhetoric has rarefied.68
Nevertheless, I do believe that there are good reasons to retain a healthy,
formal distinction between jurisdictionality and nonjurisdictionality—though
hybridization makes definitions more difficult. I will have more to say about
63. See Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 14 (1944) (“Jurisdiction to decide is jurisdiction to
make a wrong as well as a right decision.”); Dane, supra note 17, at 33 (“[A] court without jurisdiction
does not even have the right to be right.”).
64. For support of such a judgment, see Dobbs, supra note 14, at 492 (“In old-fashioned
terminology, this is morally wrong. It is unfair to the winning party. . . . Further, it is bad
administration of justice; it is inefficient as well as unfair, and it quite properly raises grave public
doubts about the judicial system.”).
65. For some criticism of such a judgment, see Lee, supra note 19, at 1623 (“Suppose the day
after Bush v. Gore it was revealed that the justices in the majority had had a covert telephone
conference call with Governor Bush in which the candidate promised to appoint a certain conservative
jurist to fill the first vacancy on the Court. . . . Clearly the fact that the Court had jurisdiction over the
subject matter would no longer secure legitimacy for the decision.”).
66. For more on the legitimacy effects of procedure, see Lawrence Solum, Procedural Justice,
78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181 (2004).
67. Nonjurisdictional bankruptcy rules, for example, may properly be nonwaivable by a
creditor if other creditors’ interests will be affected. See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 457 n.12
(2004) (acknowledging this point).
68. For more on the value of legitimate authority, see generally Joseph Raz, Legitimate
Authority, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY (1979).
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that below.69 For now, my point is just that the difficulty in conceptually
segregating jurisdictional authority and nonjurisdictional authority suggests that
jurisdictionality and nonjurisdictionality are more linkable than they might
otherwise be thought.
2. History
Historically, the idea of jurisdictionality has changed over time, and the
rhetoric of jurisdictionality as something special is a relatively modern
conceptualization. As Laura Fitzgerald has shown, English equity courts
created their own subject-matter jurisdiction by developing their own equitable
defenses and forms of relief, which then gave equity courts jurisdiction to hear
and decide common-law claims.70 Similarly, Dan Dobbs has demonstrated that
jurisdiction was often consented to in English courts.71
Even U.S. courts have not always treated jurisdiction the way they treat it
today. Fitzgerald has argued that Article III incorporated the flexibility of
English equity jurisdiction.72 Federal courts did not emphasize the rigidity of
jurisdictionality until around 1900.73 As a result, as Michael Collins has
recounted, “certain of the qualities commonly associated with the federal
courts’ concededly limited subject matter jurisdiction remained less than fully
settled throughout much of the nation’s history.”74
A prime example is the pre-twentieth century use of pleading practice to
establish jurisdiction, a practice that left jurisdiction’s establishment largely
within the parties’ control and subject to their consent and waiver.75 Before
1875, “waiver of jurisdictional objections was commonplace,”76 and it was a
“long settled rule that parties could admit jurisdictional facts.”77 At common
law, a party who raised a plea in abatement challenging a jurisdictional issue
conceded the merits,78 and other procedural rules prevented parties from
challenging jurisdiction under certain circumstances.79 As a result, “federal
69. See infra text accompanying notes 236–38.
70. See Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1207, 1253–54
(2001) (“So, too, courts of equity defined their own subject matter jurisdiction by developing unique
substantive defenses to the enforcement of rights created at common law.”).
71. Dobbs, supra note 24, at 51.
72. See Fitzgerald, supra note 70, at 1208–09 (discussing the relationship between Article III
and English equity-court traditions).
73. Dane, supra note 17, at 99–105 (tracing this history).
74. Collins, supra note 12, at 1831.
75. Id. at 1832.
76. Id. at 1876.
77. Dobbs, supra note 14, at 511.
78. See BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS, JURISDICTION, PRACTICE, AND PECULIAR
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 126 (1880); JAMES GOULD, A TREATISE ON
THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS 300 (1832).
79. See, e.g., Hartog v. Memory, 116 U.S. 588, 590 (1886) (“Neither party has the right . . .
without pleading at the proper time and in the proper way, to introduce evidence, the only purpose of
which is to make out a case for [jurisdictional] dismissal.”). This was not necessarily a consistent
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courts continued to hear cases even when it became clear that jurisdiction may
have been lacking in fact, or even concocted.”80 It was not until 1936 that
jurisdictionality attained and solidified the special stature that is conventionally
thought to characterize it today.81 This stature is therefore quite recent in light
of jurisdiction’s long history.
3. Modern Practice
In addition to theory and historical practice, certain features of current
practice undermine the special status of jurisdictionality. As a matter of existing
doctrine, jurisdictionality is not as pure as the rhetoric makes it out to be. I will
describe the impurities in more detail in Part II, but three brief examples will
help set the stage.
a. Jurisdiction to Determine Jurisdiction
The first example is the odd doctrine “jurisdiction to determine
jurisdiction.”82 The idea behind it is that a court necessarily needs some power
to decide whether it has jurisdiction or not.83 The traditional view of this
doctrine is that a federal court actually has subject-matter jurisdiction for
purposes of deciding the jurisdictional question.84 But only the Constitution and
Congress together can give a federal court subject-matter jurisdiction, and
nothing suggests that they have done so for such purposes.85 Instead,
“jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction” is a judge-made “bootstrap,”86 and its
existence runs contrary to the limited nature of federal jurisdiction, which is
supposedly immune from court control and policy necessities.87 This traditional
position between 1875 and 1936, when the Court went through a transition period regarding
jurisdictionality. See, e.g., Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U.S. 315, 326–29 (1889) (allowing a party’s
otherwise tardy jurisdictional challenge).
80. Collins, supra note 12, at 1877.
81. See id. at 1834 (explaining that the 1875 Act began a trend that culminated with the
McNutt decision in 1936).
82. For a seminal article on the topic, see Dobbs, supra note 14. For an authoritative modern
treatment, see KEVIN M. CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 4.4, 5.1 (2d ed. 2009).
83. See Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 270 U.S. 266, 274 (1925)
(“Every court of general jurisdiction has power to determine whether the conditions essential to its
exercise exist.”); RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1580 (4th ed. 1996) (“A federal court always has jurisdiction to decide whether
it has jurisdiction.”).
84. See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) (holding that a court has
jurisdiction to issue lawful injunctions to preserve the status quo while the jurisdictional issue is being
decided).
85. But see Sager, supra note 18, at 22 (asserting that “once a court is established and
empowered to decide a group of cases, it necessarily acquires some jurisdiction from its very status as
a court” and that “jurisdiction to decide jurisdiction” is “implicit in the grant or grants of jurisdiction
upon which the court is founded”).
86. See Note, Res Judicata and Jurisdiction: The Bootstrap Doctrine, 53 HARV. L. REV.
652 (1940). The term was made famous by Dobbs, supra note 14.
87. For a recent exploration of the doctrine, see Kevin M. Clermont, Sequencing the Issues for
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view of “jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction” thus shows that jurisdictionality
is more malleable than it presupposes.
A slightly different perspective of “jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction”
is that it is essentially a doctrine of issue preclusion,88 or, as perhaps more
appropriately cast, a “rule of jurisdictional finality.”89 In this formulation,
which is reflected in the Restatement,90 the primary point of the doctrine is
usually to preclude relitigation of jurisdiction once a judgment is rendered. In
short, a judgment often precludes relitigation of the rendering court’s subjectmatter jurisdiction, even if the rendering court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction.91
Even as a kind of preclusion doctrine, however, the “rule of jurisdictional
finality” says something about jurisdiction. After all, a traditional hallmark of
subject-matter jurisdiction is that a judgment entered by a court that lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction is void and has no preclusive effect.92 The “rule of
jurisdictional finality” is a judicially created exception93 that grants preclusive
effect on the question of subject-matter jurisdiction, and this is true even if the
jurisdiction of the rendering court was never challenged expressly. The doctrine
softens the typical effects of jurisdictionality, the lack of which should result in
a void and nonpreclusive judgment.94

Judicial Decisionmaking: Limitations from Jurisdictional Primacy and Intrasuit Preclusion, 63 FLA.
L. REV. 301, 317–18 (2011).
88. There are some differences between “jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction” and preclusion.
See CLERMONT, supra note 82, at §§ 4.4(B)(2)–(3), 5.1(A)(1)–(3) (distinguishing jurisdiction to
determine jurisdiction from claim and issue preclusion).
89. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 115 (1963). Perhaps the first case articulating this principle
was McCormick v. Sullivant, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 192, 199 (1825) (holding that a judgment was res
judicata even if issued without subject-matter jurisdiction).
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12, at 115 (1982) (“When a court has rendered
a judgment in a contested action, the judgment precludes the parties from litigating the question of the
court’s subject matter jurisdiction in a subsequent litigation except [under certain conditions].”).
91. See Chicot Cnty. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 376 (1940) (“[Federal
courts’] determinations of [whether they have jurisdiction to hear a case] may not be assailed
collaterally.”); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 171 (1938); see also Clermont, supra note 87, at 317
(“Because the issue of jurisdiction or notice was actually litigated and determined, even if erroneously,
the defendant cannot relitigate the same issue in subsequent litigation.”). There appear to be some
exceptions. See Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940) (allowing collateral attack under the
Bankruptcy Act); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12, at 115 (1982) (setting out three
exceptions); Clermont, supra note 87, at 318 (acknowledging that a jurisdictional ruling will not
preclude relitigation “in special circumstances, such as where the court plainly lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction or where the judgment substantially infringes on the authority of another court or
agency”).
92. See Dobbs, supra note 14, at 496 n.31 (expressing this “traditional view”).
93. Preclusion law is judicially created. See Dan B. Dobbs, Trial Court Error as an Excess of
Jurisdiction, 43 TEX. L. REV. 854, 882–90 (1965).
94. Preclusion is a nonjurisdictional affirmative defense. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c). Thus, the
operative effect of “jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction” is established only by the invocation of the
preclusion defense by a party, and it may be avoided by a party’s waiver or forfeiture of the defense.
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The justification for the “rule of jurisdictional finality” helps explain that
softening in a decidedly un-jurisdiction-like way. Preclusion is necessary, the
Supreme Court has explained, to curtail endless litigation about subject-matter
jurisdiction.95 A more pragmatic and sensible justification could not be
conceived, but it is nonetheless antithetical to jurisdictionality, which usually
marginalizes such considerations to irrelevancy. That jurisdictionality must
yield in such an event suggests that it is not as resistant to practical
considerations as the trope might suggest.
b. Resequencing
The second example is the recently developed doctrine of resequencing.96
The traditional conception of jurisdiction is that it must be resolved at the
outset—the court cannot proceed to decide other nonjurisdictional matters until
it has satisfied itself of jurisdiction.97 This conceptualization reflects a temporal
manifestation of the rigid distinction between jurisdictionality and nonjurisdictionality. And it coincides with the “power” conception of jurisdiction, without
which the court lacks the power to resolve other issues.98
But this rigidity has softened in recent cases, in which the Supreme Court
has expressed a willingness to allow lower courts to resolve a case on
nonjurisdictional procedural grounds even when jurisdictional issues remain
unresolved.99 In Sinochem International Co. v. Malay International Shipping
Corp., for example, the Court allowed the dismissal of a case under the
nonjurisdictional procedural doctrine of forum non conveniens without first
establishing the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction.100 At the same time,
95. See Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 113–14 (1963) (“It is just as important that there
should be a place to end as that there should be a place to begin litigation. After a party has his day in
court, with opportunity to present his evidence and his view of the law, a collateral attack upon the
decision as to jurisdiction there rendered merely retries the issue previously determined.”) (quoting
Stoll, 305 U.S. at 172); see also Dobbs, supra note 14, at 499 (calling it “quite a valuable tool in
stopping wasteful litigation”).
96. For extended treatments of the subject, see Clermont, supra note 87; Heather Elliott,
Jurisdictional Resequencing and Restraint, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 725 (2009); Scott C. Idleman, The
Emergence of Jurisdictional Resequencing in the Federal Courts, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2001); Peter
B. Rutledge, Decisional Sequencing, 62 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2010).
97. See Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)
(“Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause.”); see also Collins, supra note 12,
at 1830–31 (calling jurisdiction a “first principle”).
98. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998) (“The
requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter springs from the nature and limits
of the judicial power of the United States and is inflexible and without exception.”); cf. Ex parte
McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868) (“Jurisdiction is power to declare the law.”).
99. See Fitzgerald, supra note 70, at 1207 (“But in significant cases, forming a competing
tradition with its own deep roots, the Court has exchanged [its] formal, jurisdiction-first view for a
more malleable approach . . . .”).
100. See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007)
(allowing dismissal under the forum non conveniens doctrine without first establishing subject-matter
jurisdiction); cf. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583–88 (1999) (allowing dismissal
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the Court has insisted that satisfaction of jurisdiction is a prerequisite for
deciding the merits of a case.101
Resequencing thus shifts the line from between jurisdictionality and
nonjurisdictionality to between jurisdictionality and merits. The division
between jurisdiction and merits leaves out a broad swath of nonjurisdictional
procedural issues (such as forum non conveniens) that could be lumped in with
jurisdictional issues for resequencing purposes.102 In resequencing, then,
matters of jurisdiction are not so special after all.103 They share commonality
with nonjurisdictional matters of procedure as well, and that commonality is
expressed in terms of malleability.
c. Discretionary Declination of Jurisdiction
The third example is in the judicially created discretion, which courts
repeatedly exercise, to decline jurisdiction. If jurisdiction is a “virtually
unflagging obligation,”104 federal courts seem to have missed the memo. As
David Shapiro has shown, federal courts routinely choose not to exercise
jurisdiction, even if jurisdiction is proper, and despite the common rhetoric that
jurisdiction is not subject to court control.105 Abstention doctrines are the main
culprit, with the Supreme Court allowing, and even requiring, lower federal
courts to dismiss cases when jurisdiction is proper because of the consideration
of other values.106 But other doctrines exist as well, such as prudential standing
for lack of personal jurisdiction without first establishing subject-matter jurisdiction); Amchem Prods.,
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 612 (1997) (calling class certification determinations “logically
antecedent” to Article III standing issues).
101. See Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 431 (“Jurisdiction is vital only if the court proposes to issue a
judgment on the merits.”); RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1412 (6th ed. 2009) (“If the record fails to disclose a basis for
federal jurisdiction, the court must suspend determination of the merits of the controversy unless the
failure can be cured.”) (emphasis added).
102. Clermont, supra note 87 (arguing that resequencing allows a court to dismiss on
procedural questions such as abstention, exhaustion, class certification, and venue before any
jurisdictional determination).
103. True, jurisdiction differs from procedure in that the latter can be bypassed in favor of a
merits determination while the former cannot. See id. Jurisdiction may indeed have its own special
quirks. But my point here is merely to suggest that those quirks are overstated.
104. Colo. River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976); see also
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (“We have no more right to decline the
exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other
would be treason to the constitution.”).
105. See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 545 (1985)
(“[S]uggestions of an overriding obligation, subject only and at most to a few narrowly drawn
exceptions, are far too grudging in their recognition of judicial discretion in matters of jurisdiction.”);
see also Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction’s Noble Lie, 61 STAN. L. REV. 971, 990 (2009) (discussing
abstention in the context of jurisdictional obligation).
106. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 101, at 1049–152. For indictments of abstention on these
grounds, see Linda S. Mullenix, A Branch Too Far: Pruning the Abstention Doctrine, 75 GEO. L.J. 99,
103–04 (1986); Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial
Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984).
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and the judicially created justiciability doctrine of declining jurisdiction over a
case despite authorization to hear the case under Article III.107 This discretion
demonstrates that jurisdiction’s unique ideal of isolation and impenetrability is
attained less frequently than it purports.
II.
HYBRIDIZED JURISDICTION: A TAXONOMY
For these reasons, we should rethink jurisdiction and its relationship to
nonjurisdictional values and effects. Jurisdiction need not be cast as so
inflexible, isolated, and special. In this Part, I begin that process by developing
a taxonomy to frame the various ways that jurisdictionality can incorporate,
link with, and relate to elements of nonjurisdictionality. No doubt there are
other ways to classify and group the different types of hybridizations, I offer
my particular taxonomy to spur further thinking on the topic, not to maintain
that my classifications operate to the exclusion of others.
A. Incorporated Hybridization
The form of hybridization with the strongest connection between
jurisdictionality and nonjurisdictionality involves jurisdictional rules and
doctrines that, as a matter of their own definitions or conceptualizations,
incorporate nonjurisdictional features. Incorporation can occur as a matter of
judicial doctrine or as a matter of statutory expression.
1. Doctrinal Incorporation
The quintessential jurisdictional doctrine that incorporates nonjurisdictional features is personal jurisdiction. In its modern conception, personal
jurisdiction “represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of
sovereignty but as a matter of individual liberty.”108 Because of this basis, the
requirement of personal jurisdiction can, like other personal rights, be waived,
consented to, or forfeited.109 It is even subject to estoppel principles imposed
107. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). For discussions of prudential
standing, see FALLON ET AL., supra note 101, at 128–29; William A. Fletcher, The Structure of
Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 251–53 (1988).
108. Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982)
(“The requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction flows not from Art. III, but from the Due
Process Clause. The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an individual liberty
interest.”). The traditional conceptualization of personal jurisdiction, of course, was one of
governmental power and territorial sovereignty. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877) (“The
authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is
established. Any attempt to exercise authority beyond those limits would be deemed in every other
forum, as has been said by this court, an illegitimate assumption of power, and be resisted as mere
abuse.”), abrogated by Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). For a recent discussion of
the doctrine, see A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Revised Analysis, 73 U. CHI. L.
REV. 617 (2006).
109. See Ins. Corp., 456 U.S. at 703–04 (discussing both express and implied waiver); FED. R.
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under the aegis of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s sanctions
provisions.110 It is therefore a jurisdictional doctrine that inherently
incorporates nonjurisdictional features.
The takeaway from personal jurisdiction is revolutionary: doctrinal
incorporation essentially broadens the definitional scope of jurisdictionality to
include nonjurisdictional matters. Either personal jurisdiction is not
jurisdictional,111 or personal jurisdiction is a kind of hybrid. Viewing personal
jurisdiction as a definitional hybrid is a fundamentally different kind of
conceptualization of jurisdiction than that to which we are accustomed. If
jurisdiction can incorporate nonjurisdictional features, then it is no longer
limited to the rigid set of characteristics currently associated with jurisdiction.
Doctrinal incorporation opens the door to broadening our understanding of the
nature of jurisdiction.
2. Statutory Incorporation
Personal jurisdiction, though, could be cast as an anomaly because of its
nexus to the Due Process Clause and its separate jurisdictional status and
because it is not subject-matter jurisdiction, which is the power of the court
over the cause irrespective of one party’s wishes.
Perhaps personal jurisdiction is different, which is why I have described it
separately (though I will have more to say about the scope of doctrinal
incorporation later). But that does not mean that subject-matter jurisdiction
cannot incorporate nonjurisdictional features too. Congress, after all, controls
the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts, and there is no reason why
it could not draw those jurisdictional boundaries with nonjurisdictional features
in mind. Congress can then authorize these boundaries to move, or perhaps
bulge, based on party conduct or equity or judicial discretion. This may result
in jurisdictional boundaries that are more circuitous than straight, but they are
no less jurisdictional.112

CIV. P. 12(h)(1) (providing for waiver of the personal jurisdiction defense).
110. See id. at 705–06 (estopping the defendant from asserting the personal jurisdiction
defense as a sanction for failing to comply with jurisdictional discovery requests).
111. I am open to this characterization of personal jurisdiction, but I remain agnostic for
purposes of this Article. I aim here to show that if the doctrine is jurisdictional, then hybridization
provides a viable explanation of how that characterization can make sense and of what that
characterization then means for our conceptualization of jurisdictionality.
112. See Dane, supra note 17, at 65 (“[I]magine a time limit that . . . did explicitly provide that
it would not apply in the event of excusable neglect. Is there anything that would prevent the line so
drawn from being jurisdictional? Admittedly, it would be a complicated, even difficult, jurisdictional
line. But many jurisdictional lines are complicated and difficult.”); Scott Dodson, Appreciating
Mandatory Rules: A Reply to Critics, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 225, 229–30 (2008),
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/Colloquy/2008/7 (making a similar point).
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A ready example is § 2107.113 Section 2107(a) states that no appeal shall
bring a judgment for review unless a notice of appeal has been filed within
thirty days of the judgment.114 The Court has held that deadline to be
jurisdictional.115 Section 2107(a) by itself seems fairly clear, simple, and easily
characterized as jurisdictional: unless a notice is filed within thirty days, the
court of appeals has no jurisdiction.
Section 2107(c), however, complicates matters. That provision allows a
court to extend the thirty-day deadline “upon a showing of excusable neglect or
good cause.”116 The power to extend the deadline can be exercised
retroactively, even if the motion to extend is filed after the expiration of the
initial thirty-day deadline.117 Section 2107(c) also allows a district court to
“reopen” the deadline retroactively upon a finding that the putative appellant
did not receive timely notice of the judgment and that no party would be
prejudiced.118 The statutory jurisdictional limit thus expressly contemplates
judicial discretion and considerations of equity.
It is true that the statutory powers to tinker with the jurisdictional deadline
under § 2107(c) are given to the district court rather than the appellate court,
but Congress could have given them to the appellate court, and the difference is
immaterial for my purposes here. The general point would be the same in either
case: the appellate deadline may be jurisdictional, but its boundary is affected
by the equitable discretion of the federal courts and on party conduct (as in
making an appropriate and timely motion). The statute expressly incorporates
nonjurisdictional features into its jurisdictional limit.
At first blush, this statutory hybridization in appellate jurisdiction seems
odd because considerations of equity and judicial discretion are antithetical to
jurisdictional custom. But, to reiterate, nothing inherent in jurisdictionality
prevents this kind of incorporation. Nonjurisdictional considerations may
create bulges in the jurisdictional line, but that does not make the line itself
any less jurisdictional.
3. Implied Incorporation
The civil appellate deadline in § 2107(c) is an obvious candidate for
incorporated hybridization because it expressly permits extensions of the
jurisdictional thirty-day deadline based on the discretionary factor of “good
113. Another example might be 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2006), which allows district courts
discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. I discuss § 1367(c) in more detail below.
See infra text accompanying notes 214–227.
114. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a).
115. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007) (“Today we make clear that the timely filing
of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.”).
116. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c).
117. Id. (stating that the motion may be filed “not later than 30 days after the expiration of the
time otherwise set for bringing appeal”).
118. Id.
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cause.” The text itself explicitly incorporates nonjurisdictional features, so the
characterization naturally follows.
But what if the text is not so clear? In a less clear case, the taxonomy
might make room for incorporated hybridization that is implicit, if not explicit.
Those who subscribe to interpretive tools that go beyond express terms might
find little difference between express and implied hybridization. The critical
point I want to highlight here is that, whatever one’s preferred interpretive
methodology, the mere characterization of a statutory limit as jurisdictional
does not preclude implicit incorporation of nonjurisdictional features.
Expanding the taxonomy’s “statutory incorporation” category to statutes
with implicit incorporation might address a number of troublesome
circumstances. Justice Hugo Black’s dissent from the denial of certiorari in
Teague v. Regional Commissioner of Customs illustrates one possibility.119 In
that case, the petitioner filed two days outside § 2101’s ninety-day statutory
deadline to file a petition for certiorari120 because an unusually severe
snowstorm delayed the mail for four days.121 The statute did not expressly
encompass an exception for untimely petitions, but Justice Black nevertheless
would have allowed the petition. He wrote:
I agree, of course, that we should follow the statute. But we must first
determine what the statute means. . . . [The Court] suggest[s] that the
statute deprives this Court of all power to hear cases filed after the 90day period, regardless of whether the delay was caused by snowstorms
making the transportation of the mails impossible. Under no known
principle of statutory construction can such an interpretation of
§ 2101(c) be supported. The statute does not say explicitly that the
time limitation may be inapplicable under certain extenuating
circumstances but it also does not say that the time limit must be
ruthlessly applied in every conceivable situation, without regard to
hardships involved or extenuating circumstances present. The Court
therefore must decide what is the more sensible interpretation of the
statute. I for one cannot think of any purpose Congress might have had
that could possibly be served by holding that a litigant can be defeated
solely because of a delay that was entirely beyond his control.122
Perhaps Justice Black was arguing for an exception to the statutory limit
based on equitable considerations. If so, that argument would have been at odds
with the modern conception of jurisdictionality, for equity cannot overcome a

119. 394 U.S. 977 (1969).
120. 28 U.S.C. § 2101.
121. Teague v. Reg’l Comm’r of Customs, 394 U.S. 977, 977, 981 (1969) (Black, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari). A related example is Justice Douglas’s dissent from a denial of
certiorari in Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 962, 962–64 (1971) (arguing that the certiorari
deadline should be excused for a petition filed one day late because the petition would have been
timely if not lost by the courier).
122. Teague, 394 U.S. at 982–83 (Black, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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jurisdictional bar. But if jurisdictionality can be hybridized, and if that
hybridization can be implied, then Justice Black’s argument can be
characterized in a different way that is far more satisfying. One need not argue
for a judicially created exception at all. Rather, one can construe the
jurisdictional statute as implicitly incorporating nonjurisdictional features,
much as § 2107(c) does expressly. Following that implicit hybridization is
consistent with jurisdictionality, not contrary to it.123
One might rightfully object here on the ground that implicit incorporation
functionally looks a lot like judicial derogation of jurisdictional limits. I do not
mean to sanction judicial disregard of statutory limits, whether jurisdictional or
not. But I do mean to argue that a jurisdictional statute can incorporate
nonjurisdictional features, such as equity and discretion. And if one believes
that statutory directives can be implicit as well as explicit, then there is no
reason why those implied directives cannot be hybridizations. Under such an
interpretive methodology, construing a jurisdictional statute to implicitly
incorporate nonjurisdictional features can be justified as following the statute,
rather than being in derogation of it. The point here is that things may depend
upon one’s preferred method of statutory interpretation, but they ought not
depend upon the jurisdictional nature of the statute at hand.
B. Linked Hybridization
A second form of hybridization is not inherently or textually incorporated
into jurisdictional contours but instead manifests itself through a direct
connection between jurisdictionality and nonjurisdictionality. This “linked
hybridization” encompasses jurisdictional rules and doctrines that are tied to
nonjurisdictional rules or doctrines in ways that condition jurisdictionality on
nonjurisdictional occurrences. Linked hybridization, unlike incorporated
hybridization, treats the jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional features as coupled
but distinct, allowing them to be segregated analytically for differential
treatment. There are two subspecies in this category: triggers and preconditions.
1. Triggers
Triggers are nonjurisdictional timing mechanisms for controlling jurisdictional questions. The trigger does not affect the answer to the jurisdictional
question except to the extent that the answer changes based on when the question is answered. In visual terms, the jurisdictional bullet fires only when the
trigger is pulled. Nothing can stop the bullet once the trigger is pulled, but when
and how that trigger is pulled is subject to nonjurisdictional considerations.
The quintessential trigger is the time-of-invocation rule. The traditional
conceptualization of jurisdiction is that it must be established at the time a party
123. For a related discussion of Teague and jurisdictional time limits, see Dane, supra note 17,
at 18–20 (arguing that jurisdictional limits need not be read literally and mercilessly).

01-Dodson (Do Not Delete)

1462

11/7/2011 10:32 AM

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99:1439

invokes the federal forum.124 This time-of-invocation rule is consistent with the
“power” theory of jurisdiction: if a court lacks jurisdiction, it has no authority
to do anything other than dismiss.125
Despite its connection to judicial power, the time-of-invocation rule is
itself a nonjurisdictional rule. In other words, the time-of-invocation rule can be
shifted or discarded based on traditionally nonjurisdictional justifications.
Shifting the rule can make a profound difference in jurisdictional
determinations because developments in cases as they progress can change
jurisdictional entitlements. Thus, for example, a case between non-diverse
parties with a federal claim and a related state claim that is filed or removed to
federal court based on federal-question jurisdiction can stay in federal court
even after the federal question claim is dismissed because jurisdiction was
settled at the time of invocation.126 Similarly, a case that originally had no basis
for federal jurisdiction and thus was filed in state court can, if it later acquires a
basis for federal jurisdiction, be removed to federal court because the
jurisdictional question was settled not at the time of state filing but at the time
of federal removal.127
One can quibble over the proper temporal place for jurisdictional
determinations, but I am not concerned with that issue here. Rather, the critical
feature of the time-of-invocation rule for my purposes is that the rule is
nonjurisdictional. The Court confirmed its nonjurisdictional character in
Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis,128 in which a case was removed to federal court on
grounds of diversity jurisdiction, but in fact a non-diverse defendant existed at
the time of removal. Accordingly, at the time when jurisdiction should have
been assessed, the court lacked jurisdiction. Later, the jurisdictional defect was
124. Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 537, 539 (1824) (“It is quite clear, that the
jurisdiction of the Court depends upon the state of things at the time of the action brought, and that
after vesting, it cannot be ousted by subsequent events.”).
125. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998) (“The requirement that
jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter springs from the nature and limits of the judicial power
of the United States and is inflexible and without exception.”). On the other hand, the rule allows a
federal court to hear a case in which jurisdiction was established at the time of invocation even if
subsequent events would destroy jurisdiction. See infra text accompanying note 126.
126. See Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 583–84 (2004) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (“The Court has long applied Marshall’s time-of-filing rule categorically to postfiling
changes that otherwise would destroy diversity jurisdiction.”); St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red
Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 294–95 (1938) (“It uniformly has been held that in a suit properly begun in the
federal court the change of citizenship of a party does not oust the jurisdiction. The same rule governs
a suit originally brought in a state court and removed to a federal court.”); id. at 289–90 (“Events
occurring subsequent to the institution of suit which reduce the amount recoverable below the statutory
limit do not oust jurisdiction.”). There are exceptions to this general rule, of course. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(e) (2006) (authorizing remand after a post-removal joinder that destroys subject-matter
jurisdiction).
127. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 73 (1996) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1441 as
embodying the time-of-removal rule); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (providing for removal when an
amended pleading makes clear that the case “has become removable”).
128. 519 U.S. 61 (1996).
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“cured” when the non-diverse defendant settled and was dismissed, leaving all
diversity requirements satisfied.129
Although the jurisdictional defect had been cured, the statutory defect—
noncompliance with the time-of-invocation rule—remained.130 Nevertheless,
the Court held that, because the case had already gone to trial, “considerations
of finality, efficiency, and economy” overcame the time-of-invocation
requirement.131 Caterpillar thus makes clear that the time-of-invocation rule is
nonjurisdictional and susceptible to policy values that could not apply to a
jurisdictional doctrine.132 In short, the time-of-invocation rule is a trigger for
the jurisdictional determination, but nonjurisdictional considerations help
determine when that trigger is pulled.
Note that the time-of-invocation rule is not entirely divorced from
jurisdictional requirements. If the time-of-invocation rule applies and requires
dismissal, the dismissal is for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under
Rule 12(b)(1), with all the normal characteristics of a jurisdictional defect.133 In
other words, the time-of-invocation rule does trigger a jurisdictional bullet. But
the point here is that the trigger itself is subject to nonjurisdictional
considerations and, in cases not governed by statute, purely court created.134
Thus, the procedural rule controls the jurisdictional question.
2. Preconditions
Preconditions are antecedent nonjurisdictional events that link directly to
jurisdictional questions.135 Take, once again, the appellate deadline of § 2107,
which requires that a “notice of appeal” be “filed” within the time window.136
The statute conditions appellate jurisdiction on the existence of a timely filed
notice. But what constitutes a “notice” or a “filing” is not defined in the statute

129. Id. at 64, 73.
130. Id. at 73.
131. Id. at 75. Despite the nonjurisdictional status of the time-of-invocation rule, not all of its
manifestations are overcome by this combination of factors. See Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp.,
L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 574 (2004) (refusing to shift the rule for post-invocation changes of citizenship of a
continuing party).
132. Other cases have held similarly. See Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S.
826, 836–38 (1989) (correcting a time-of-filing flaw in an original diversity action); Grubbs v. Gen.
Elec. Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699 (1972) (correcting a time-of-removal flaw); Baggs v. Martin, 179
U.S. 206, 209 (1900) (curing a time-of-filing defect); cf. Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 16
(1951) (expressing the same principle in dictum).
133. See Grupo Dataflux, 541 U.S. at 574–75 (“Unless the Court is to manufacture a brandnew exception to the time-of-filing rule, dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is the only
option available in this case.”).
134. See id. at 583 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining that the “practical time-of-filing rule
[is not derived] from any constitutional or statutory text”).
135. I introduced this concept in Dodson, supra note 112, at 229. See also Mark A. Hall, The
Jurisdictional Nature of the Time to Appeal, 21 GA. L. REV. 399, 410 (1986) (“[N]otice of appeal
timing limitations simply impose a mandatory precondition to acquiring appellate jurisdiction . . . .”).
136. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a) (2006).
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and thus may be subject to some judicial discretion in interpretation. Thus, for
example, the word “notice” can mean an appellate brief as well as a formal
notice of appeal.137 In addition, the term “filed” can include a pro se prisoner’s
delivery of the petition to prison officials.138
The latter scenario was at issue in Houston v. Lack, a case in which a pro
se prisoner filed a habeas petition that was denied by the district court. The
prisoner drafted a notice of appeal and, twenty-seven days after the judgment,
delivered the notice to prison officials for forwarding to the court. The notice
was then filed with the court four days later—one day after the thirty-day
deadline.139 The Supreme Court noted that the statute “does not define when a
notice of appeal has been ‘filed’ or designate the person with whom it must be
filed.”140 The corresponding rules, the Court acknowledged, do specify that the
notice must be filed with the clerk of the district court, but they do not state
when that must happen.141 Considering the special difficulties confronting pro
se prisoner litigants seeking to ensure timely filing of appellate papers, the
Court construed “filed” to mean, in cases of pro se prisoners, delivery to
prison officials.142
Other examples abound. A “final” decision is required for federal
appellate jurisdiction,143 but what constitutes a “final” decision may be subject
to some nonjurisdictional considerations. Thus, an interlocutory district-court
order can be deemed “final” under the judicially created “collateral order”
doctrine if, among other things, the issue is “too important” to be denied
immediate review.144 Also, a district court can exercise discretion to render
certain nonfinal decisions as final if it finds that there is “no just reason for

137. See Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 245 (1992) (treating an appellate brief as a “notice of
appeal” for purposes of Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure).
138. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 268 (1988).
139. Id. at 268.
140. Id. at 272. The Court was unanimous on this point. See id. at 278 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(conceding that “the statute itself does not define when a notice of appeal has been ‘filed’ or designate
with whom it must be filed”).
141. Id. at 273 (“The question [under Rules 3 and 4] is one of timing, not destination . . . .
[N]either Rule sets forth criteria for determining the moment at which the ‘filing’ has occurred.”).
142. Id. at 270–71.
143. 28 U.S.C. § 1291(a) (2006). Another “finality” rule governs Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction over state-court decisions and admits of some exceptions despite its jurisdictional nature.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 479–83 (1975). For a discussion of
these finality requirements in the context of jurisdictional clarity, see Scott Dodson, The Complexity of
Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA. L. REV. 1 (2011). For criticism of the collateral-order rule, see Adam N.
Steinman, Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1237 (2007).
144. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) (defining the collateralorder doctrine as “that small class which finally determine claims of right separable from, and
collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the
cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated”); see
also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 690–92 (1974) (holding an order rejecting a claim of
executive privilege to be appealable).
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delay.”145 Finally, a district court can certify an interlocutory decision as
appealable if it finds that the decision “involves a controlling question of law as
to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an
immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation.”146
Note that these preconditions to jurisdiction differ from procedural
preconditions to suit. Procedural preconditions to suit, such as exhaustion
requirements, are preconditions, but they are not jurisdictional hybridizations
because they do not implicate jurisdictional determinations at all. Instead, they
are stand-alone procedural rules that may be raised by way of defense or,
perhaps more often, by way of a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 12(c).147
By contrast, preconditions to jurisdiction are nonjurisdictional requirements
whose satisfactions are necessary for the exercise of jurisdiction.148
A competing take on preconditions is that they are merely interpretations
of jurisdictional requirements and thus are themselves jurisdictional.149 Because
appellate jurisdiction requires a “final” decision, it could be argued that a
determination of finality is not a nonjurisdictional precondition but rather an
interpretation of an inherent component of appellate jurisdiction. Jurisdictional
terms may need judicial explication just as any other terms, and that explication
does not necessarily hybridize them with nonjurisdictional features.
In general, I agree that some interpretations of jurisdictional terms are
themselves jurisdictional and unhybridized. The statutory directive that a
corporation is a citizen of its state of incorporation150 is a jurisdictional
requirement that seems, at least on its face, unsusceptible to direct
hybridization (though a more subtly linked hybridization might still occur at the
proof stage).151

145. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b).
146. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). One could interpret this as a form of statutory incorporation of
hybridization instead of a precondition, in that § 1292(b) creates an exception to the finality
requirement of appellate jurisdiction that is grounded in judicial discretion. My thanks to David
Shapiro for prodding me on this point.
147. See, e.g., Reed Elsevier Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1241, 1246 (2010) (holding
the registration requirement of the Copyright Act to be a precondition to suit); Jones v. Block, 549 U.S.
199, 216 (2007) (holding exhaustion to be a mandatory but nonjurisdictional precondition to suit);
Zipes v. TWA, 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982) (holding the limitations period for filing a Title VII lawsuit to
be a nonjurisdictional precondition to suit).
148. See Pinion v. Dow Chem., U.S.A., 928 F.2d 1522, 1525 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991) (“As
mandatory preconditions to our exercise of jurisdiction, however, filing rules like Rule 4(a) are
‘jurisdictional’ in the sense that, absent compliance, we can acquire no jurisdiction of the cause even if
it is otherwise within our competence.”); cf. Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992) (“Although
courts should construe [the ‘notice’ requirement] liberally when determining whether it has been
complied with, noncompliance is fatal to an appeal.”).
149. My thanks to Sam Jordan for encouraging me to think through this counterproposal.
150. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c).
151. See infra text accompanying notes 153–77.
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In other circumstances that are more ambiguous, such as the finality
requirement, an interpretative characterization may be plausible. I do think that
some requirements, such as the “filed” requirement of § 2107, are more clearly
preconditional than interpretive. But I concede that, in many cases, both
characterizations are possible. My primary aim is not so much to definitively
resolve the characterization as to demonstrate the viability of hybridization as a
possibility, and then to open the floor for debate.
Having said that, however, I generally find the hybridization
characterization more satisfying than the interpretative characterization for two
reasons. First, hybridization narrows jurisdiction more than interpretation,
which seems to retain full jurisdictional status, and, for reasons discussed in
Part IV, the narrowing of jurisdiction has much to commend it.152 Second,
hybridization helps resolve the tension between jurisdictionality and discretion
better than interpretation. Hybridization conceptually disaggregates the
jurisdictional issue (whether the appellate court has jurisdiction, an issue that is
not subject to discretion) from the nonjurisdictional issue (whether the decision
below is “final,” which is subject to discretion) in a way that alleviates the
tension. By contrast, interpreting a purely jurisdictional requirement in a
flexible way exacerbates the tension.
For those who insist that the finality doctrine is still just a matter of
interpretation, the taxonomy demonstrates how a modest reorientation of the
conceptualization of the interpretative process can be useful. Instead of
thinking of the finality doctrine as a flexible interpretation of a firm
jurisdictional phrase, the use of implied-incorporation hybridization discussed
above might suggest that Congress implicitly incorporated flexibility into the
meaning of “finality.” Hybridization thus provides an alternative to the
interpretive theory.
C. Indirect Hybridization
The subtlest form of hybridization is what I term “indirect hybridization.”
These are jurisdictional rules and doctrines that cross paths with generalized
nonjurisdictional rules or doctrines in ways that can allow for the mixing of the
two, but they are not linked as directly as preconditions or timing rules. There
are at least two subspecies of indirect hybridization. The first encompasses
matters of proof, and the second encompasses prophylactic rules.
1. Matters of Proof
Jurisdiction itself is “a legal conclusion, a consequence of facts rather than
a provable ‘fact.’”153 In other words, jurisdiction flows from the determination
of certain facts. But the determination of those facts may not itself be
152.
153.

See infra text accompanying notes 236–38.
Meridian Sec. Ins. Co. v. Sadowski, 441 F.3d 536, 541 (7th Cir. 2006) (Easterbrook, J.).

01-Dodson (Do Not Delete)

2011]

11/7/2011 10:32 AM

HYBRIDIZING JURISDICTION

1467

jurisdictional. To the contrary, our adversarial system delegates to the parties
the primary role in the identification, isolation, development, and proof of facts,
including jurisdictional facts.
Party control over these facts and the nonjurisdictional rules that attach to
them enable regulation of jurisdiction in a number of ways. The following
examples illustrate how.
Normal diversity jurisdiction requires that the amount in controversy
exceed $75,000.154 There is no dispute that the amount-in-controversy
threshold is a jurisdictional issue—if the amount does not exceed that
threshold, then the court lacks diversity jurisdiction.155 But how does the court
determine whether that requirement is met?
The answer is that the court relies upon a series of standards of pleading
and proof that lead to a “formal” finding on jurisdiction that may be at odds
with the “actual” existence or nonexistence of jurisdiction.156 The reason is that
the law requires that a decision be made one way or another, and the need for a
decision can be more important than the correctness of the decision.157 Further,
because the parties select the facts and arguments that the court considers, the
court may reach a decision that, though justified on what the parties present,
nevertheless is incorrect.158 In other words, procedural mechanisms govern and
control the jurisdiction-determining process.
Several procedures illustrate how this occurs. At the pleading stage, the
plaintiff’s good-faith allegation controls unless it can be shown to a legal certainty that the plaintiff cannot recover that amount.159 As long as the allegation
is in good faith and unchallenged, then the court has jurisdiction. But because
jurisdiction is predicated on the parties’ pleading choices, it may have little
154. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
155. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (calling the amount-incontroversy requirement “an ingredient of subject-matter jurisdiction”).
156. These terms are akin to what Michael Pardo calls “procedural accuracy” and “material
accuracy” and to what Robert Summers calls “formal legal truth” and “substantive truth.” Michael S.
Pardo, Pleadings, Proof, and Judgment: A Unified Theory of Civil Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1451,
1470 (2010); Robert S. Summers, Formal Legal Truth and Substantive Truth in Judicial FactFinding—Their Justified Divergence in Some Particular Cases, 18 LAW & PHIL. 497, 498 (1999).
157. See Summers, supra note 156, at 505–06 (“The law almost invariably calls for a definite
decision, for or against one side to litigation. . . . [T]he judicial proceeding may be characterized less as
a search for substantive truth than as a search for a definite winner.”).
158. See id. at 504 (“[T]he fact-finder is merely to sit back and hear evidence presented by the
opposing lawyers, evidence which at least in some cases would fall short of the whole truth that might
be found were the court itself to make an independent investigation.”); id. at 505 (“Among other
things, this means that some facts may be formally found or not found, even though the substantive
truth be otherwise. Because of any number of factors, one side may fail to introduce enough evidence
to establish a fact, even though the evidence is available.”).
159. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288–89 (1938) (“The rule
governing dismissal for want of jurisdiction in cases brought in the federal court is that, unless the law
gives a different rule, the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in good
faith. . . . It must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional
amount to justify dismissal.”).
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factual basis. In fact, jurisdiction may be lacking, but the law allows the parties’
pleadings to establish it anyway. This mechanism is especially important in
valuing equitable remedies for purposes of the amount-in-controversy
requirement because the valuation is so dependent upon party assessment.160
This pleading mechanism is not unlike the pre-1875 tradition of using
pleadings to establish subject-matter jurisdiction.161 There are some differences,
of course. For example, under pre-1875 doctrine, the defendant could waive its
objections to jurisdictional pleadings,162 whereas modern doctrine prevents a
defendant from waiving, consenting to, or forfeiting jurisdictional challenges.
But the similarity is still strong: under either regime, the plaintiff’s pleading
can, in the absence of contrary assertions or proof, establish jurisdiction.163
If a party or the court challenges the facts underlying the amount-incontroversy allegation, then the party invoking federal jurisdiction must prove
those facts by a preponderance of the evidence.164 But here, too, procedural
rules regulate jurisdiction. The court likely will hold a hearing, take evidence
and testimony, find facts, and then make a ruling on the jurisdictional issue.165
In such a hearing, the Federal Rules of Evidence apply.166 Those are

160. Cf. Brittain Shaw McInnis, Comment, The $75,000.01 Question: What is the Value of
Injunctive Relief?, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1013, 1018–19 (1998) (stating that the diversity statute
provides no guidance on how to value equitable relief for purposes of the amount-in-controversy
requirement so that the plaintiff’s evaluation will usually control).
161. See supra text accompanying notes 75–80.
162. See Collins, supra note 12, at 1876 (recounting the prevalence of jurisdictional waiver);
see also Dobbs, supra note 14, at 511 (recounting the practice of admitting jurisdictional facts).
163. For a recent application of the principle that some contestation is required to enable
scrutinization of the jurisdictional facts, see Meridian Sec. Ins. Co. v. Sadowski, 441 F.3d 536, 543
(7th Cir. 2006) (Easterbrook, J.) (“None of Meridian’s jurisdictional allegations was contested, so the
standard of proof is irrelevant.”).
164. See McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936) (“If his
allegations of jurisdictional facts are challenged by his adversary in any appropriate manner, he must
support them by competent proof. And where they are not so challenged the court may still insist that
the jurisdictional facts be established or the case be dismissed, and for that purpose the court may
demand that the party alleging jurisdiction justify his allegations by a preponderance of evidence.”).
This burden can be difficult for defendants justifying removal in the face of a complaint that lacks an
allegation for sum-certain relief. See Alice M. Noble-Allgire, Removal of Diversity Actions When the
Amount in Controversy Cannot Be Determined from the Face of Plaintiff’s Complaint: The Need for
Judicial and Statutory Reform to Preserve Defendant’s Equal Access to Federal Courts, 62 MO. L.
REV. 681, 683–85 (1997) (explaining and discussing those difficulties). For a different view, see Kevin
M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Fact, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 973, 1008–09 (2006) (arguing that when
jurisdictional facts going to the amount-in-controversy determination overlap with the merits, merely a
prima facie standard applies to establish the jurisdictional facts).
165. See Jerome B. Grubhart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 537–38
(1995) (“Normal practice permits a party to establish jurisdiction at the outset of a case by means of a
nonfrivolous assertion of jurisdictional elements, and any litigation of a contested subject-matter
jurisdictional fact issue occurs in comparatively summary procedure before a judge alone.”).
166. See FED. R. EVID. 101 (applying the Rules to “proceedings” in federal courts); FED. R.
EVID. 1101(d) (providing for exclusions that do not mention jurisdictional determinations); Meridian
Security, 441 F.3d at 541 (asserting that the proof must be founded upon “admissible evidence”); cf.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (“doubt[ing]” that normal evidentiary rules do
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nonjurisdictional rules governing what evidence can and cannot be considered
in the determination. In addition, certain waiver rules apply to the production of
and objection to evidence at a court hearing.167 Finally, a burden of proof will
be imposed on one of the parties. These rules allow for party manipulation of
evidence used to establish or refute jurisdiction.168
To illustrate, say a case is filed in Delaware federal court on diversity
jurisdiction grounds. The plaintiff alleges that she is a domiciliary of New
York. She also alleges that the defendant, a corporation, is a citizen of
Delaware because it is incorporated there and has its principal place of business
there.169 The Supreme Court has held that a corporation’s principal place of
business ordinarily is where the company’s “main headquarters” is.170 This
defendant, however, has two separate headquarters offices, one in Delaware
and one in New York. Neither party, though, raises the possibility that the
defendant is a citizen of New York because both parties prefer to litigate in a
federal forum.171
Nevertheless, on a motion for summary judgment, it comes to the
attention of the judge that the defendant may be non-diverse because its
principal place of business is actually located in New York rather than
Delaware. Accordingly, the judge holds a hearing on the defendant’s
citizenship to determine whether, at the time of filing, the defendant’s principal
place of business was New York or Delaware.
In that hearing, the parties cannot stipulate jurisdiction, but how far down
the fact ladder does the jurisdictional bar to stipulation go? Can the parties
instead stipulate to certain facts that would tend to show that the defendant’s
principal place of business is Delaware? If a fact supporting that result is
objectionable hearsay, but no one objects to it as such, must the court accept it?
If a fact undermining that result is hearsay and both parties object on that
ground, must the court exclude it?172 Can the parties use admissions made in a
response to a request for admissions to bind the court’s fact finding?173 If the
not apply in the analogous scenario of class certification).
167. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 103 (requiring contemporaneous objections that are waived if not
made); id. 408 (excluding offers to compromise as evidence in certain circumstances).
168. To go even one step deeper, nonjurisdictional discovery procedures and mechanisms
control parties’ access to jurisdictional discovery for use in the proof stages. For a comprehensive
analysis of jurisdictional discovery, see S.I. Strong, Jurisdictional Discovery in United States Federal
Courts, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 489 (2010).
169. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (2006) (establishing requirements for corporate citizenship for
diversity purposes).
170. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1193 (2010).
171. It is worth noting that the party’s pleadings alleging the defendant’s principal place of
business could easily pass the Rule 11(b) test of good faith because the question of corporate
citizenship can, as the Supreme Court conceded, be a “hard case[]” that may be susceptible to
reasonable, though contradictory, applications. Id. at 1194.
172. Potentially yes. See id. at 1195 (stating that jurisdictional proof must be “competent”).
173. Potentially yes. See Meridian Sec. Ins. Co. v. Sadowski, 441 F.3d 536, 541 (7th Cir.
2006) (stating that a defendant can prove jurisdiction using “contentions interrogatories or admissions
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judge also wants to keep the case, can the judge discharge her duty by asking
the defendant’s CEO where the company’s main control occurs, and, upon
receiving the answer of “Delaware,” find jurisdiction in the face of no other
proffered evidence or testimony?174
These questions are designed to elicit a point: whether jurisdiction exists
is a complicated inquiry that is obscured by the application of various
procedural rules, party actions, and court decisions that occur within the
confines of the proof mechanism of the adversary system. They are not fanciful
questions. As a real-world example, some courts have held that Rule 408(a) of
the Federal Rules of Evidence prohibits the use of settlement materials to prove
or contest the amount in controversy for purposes of determining diversity
jurisdiction, even if those materials might resolve the jurisdictional issue more
accurately.175 Further, nonjurisdictional procedures that would allow
jurisdiction to be determined based on party conduct and judicial discretion are
constitutional,176 and Congress rarely prescribes a method for establishing
jurisdiction, leaving such procedures to the discretion of the judiciary.177
The point of all this is that the practical realities of our adversarial system
apply to, and therefore exert some control over, jurisdictional proof. Those
nonjurisdictional mechanisms, therefore, indirectly hybridize with the
jurisdictional questions they govern in a way that allows the nonjurisdictional
features to control the underlying jurisdictional determination.
2. Prophylactic Rules
A second form of indirect hybridization is the use of prophylactic rules to
resolve jurisdictional questions. Prophylactic rules set boundaries apart from
the line at issue. Typical prophylactic rules include clear-statement rules and
presumptions.178 Prophylactic rules are judicially created and based on a
in state court”).
174. Potentially no, though not necessarily for jurisdictional reasons. See Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at
1195 (“[W]e reject suggestions such as, for example, the one made by petitioner that the mere filing of
a form like the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Form 10-K listing a corporation’s ‘principal
executive offices’ would, without more be sufficient proof to establish a corporation’s ‘nerve
center.’”).
175. See, e.g., McDevitt v. Guenther, 522 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1284–86 (D. Haw. 2007). Other
courts have allowed the evidence, but primarily under a recognized exception to the Rule as opposed
to on grounds that the Rule does not apply to jurisdictional hearings at all. See, e.g., McPhail v. Deere
& Co., 529 F.3d 947, 956 (10th Cir. 2008).
176. Collins, supra note 12, at 1883 (pointing out that the Constitution does not prescribe the
procedures for establishing jurisdiction, and that the historical practice of allowing jurisdiction by
consent suggests that such procedures are constitutional); Dobbs, supra note 14, at 506 (“Certainly
there is nothing unconstitutional about jurisdiction by estoppel.”).
177. See Wetmore v. Rymer, 169 U.S. 115, 120–21 (1898) (noting the lack of congressionally
prescribed procedures and stating that such an absence reflected an intention to delegate the adoption
of such procedures to the courts).
178. For a seminal treatment of these topics, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV.
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consideration of judicial discretion and competing policies.179 Much like rules
of proof, prophylactic rules regulate jurisdiction indirectly.
Take, for example, the presumption that a statutory condition is
nonjurisdictional unless Congress expressly ranks it as jurisdictional.180
Conceivably, a statutory limit could be jurisdictional without express indication
that it should be treated as such.181 Yet the presumption (if not overridden by
other factors) would require federal courts to exercise jurisdiction anyway until
Congress amended the statute with clearer language. Another example is the
presumption, created in Michigan v. Long, that a state-court decision on a
federal claim is based on federal law unless the state court clearly states that its
decision is based on an independent and adequate state ground.182
Such presumptions are nonjurisdictional in nature. They are creatures of
the judiciary. And it is up to the courts’ discretion when and how they are
employed. Thus, the Supreme Court has imposed the statutory presumption to
guard against the waste of resources that jurisdictionality can produce.183 And it
imposed the Michigan v. Long presumption to ease its own burden when
interpreting state-court opinions.184

593 (1992) (cataloguing variants of clear-statement rules and the levels of clarity required for each).
179. See John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
399 (2010) (arguing that clear-statement rules are inappropriate as constitutional prophylaxes).
180. See Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1245 (2010) (analyzing whether
the Copyright Act’s registration requirement “clearly states” that it is jurisdictional); Arbaugh v. Y &
H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515–16 (2006) (“If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a
statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional, then courts and litigants will be duly instructed and will not
be left to wrestle with the issue. But when Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as
jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.”) (citation omitted).
These are statutory-coverage examples. For a discussion of the Arbaugh clear-statement rule in a
procedural context, see Dodson, supra note 20, at 66–71. Other examples of presumptions and clearstatement rules abound, particularly in the jurisdiction-stripping context. See, e.g., Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (imposing a clear-statement rule for legislation purporting to strip
judicial review over executive-detention decisions); Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348, 351
(2001) (refusing to read statute as stripping original habeas jurisdiction absent clear statement). For
commentary, see James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to
Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1433, 1498–500 (2000) (discussing alternative review
mechanisms); Cass R. Sunstein, Clear Statement Principles and National Security: Hamdan and
Beyond, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 46 (supporting the use of clear-statement rules for jurisdiction stripping
in detention cases).
181. See, e.g., Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209–11 (2007) (holding the appellate deadline
to file a civil notice of appeal to be jurisdictional despite the lack of express indication of
jurisdictionality).
182. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040–41 (1983) (presuming, absent a clear
statement, that the state-court decision rests upon an independent and adequate state ground, and that
the state court decided the issue according to federal law, thereby rendering the decision appealable to
the U.S. Supreme Court). The independent and adequate state-law ground is a component of appellate
jurisdiction. See Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 534 n.* (1992).
183. See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515 (adopting a clear-statement rule because of the threat of
“unfairness” and “waste of judicial resources”).
184. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1041 (“In this way, both justice and judicial administration will be
greatly improved.”).
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The nonjurisdictional stature of clear-statement rules and presumptions is
even clearer when one recognizes that the Court just as easily could have
crafted these presumptions in the inverse direction—against jurisdiction. Under
that inverse presumption, a statutory limit would be jurisdictional unless
Congress clearly stated otherwise, and a state-court decision would be deemed
to have been decided on state-law grounds unless the state court clearly stated
otherwise.185 Those inverse presumptions, by the way, could be justified on the
grounds that federal courts ought not overstep their jurisdictional mandates and
that, as a result, the more legitimizing course would be to decline jurisdiction
absent a clear basis for exercising it.186
Which direction is most proper is not my concern here. Rather, I mean to
highlight the distinction between the jurisdictional authorization to hear a case
and the procedural power to control that authorization. Presumptions and clearstatement rules are procedural mechanisms, developed and set by judicial
discretion, that create space between the existence of jurisdiction and the
exercise of jurisdiction. Within that space, adherence to the procedural rule
affects the jurisdictional inquiry.
III.
THE EXPLANATORY POWER OF THE TAXONOMY
The taxonomy described in Part II can help characterize and explain
doctrines and rules that otherwise would not fit comfortably into the
jurisdictional-nonjurisdictional dichotomy. This Part shows how the taxonomy
can both broaden and focus the conceptualizations of some of these
troublesome doctrines.
A. Indirect Hybridization
Sovereign immunity is the right or privilege of the sovereign to be
immune from private suits without its consent.187 Although there are various
ways to characterize the doctrine,188 one way is as a limitation on federal-court
jurisdiction. After all, the primary textual manifestation of state sovereign
immunity is the Eleventh Amendment, which speaks of limiting the “[j]udicial
power of the United States.”189 The Court has sent mixed signals in its
characterization of state sovereign immunity, but at least some of those signals
185. Indeed, before Michigan v. Long, the Court sometimes applied just this inverse
presumption. See id. at 1038–39 (explaining prior practice).
186. For a discussion of the “direction” or jurisdictional presumptions and clear-statement
rules, see Dodson, supra at 143, at 37–40.
187. For an excellent and extended treatment of state sovereign immunity, see CLYDE E.
JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (1972).
188. For an argument that sovereign immunity itself is nonjurisdictional, see Dodson, supra
note 7, at 19–28 (providing the argument that state sovereign immunity is mandatory but
nonjurisdictional).
189. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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have cast it as jurisdictional.190 And many commentators have considered the
immunity to be jurisdictional.191
Despite its potentially jurisdictional status, state sovereign immunity can
be waived.192 Also, it is subject to a judicially created exception for prospective
injunctive or declaratory relief against a state officer.193 Finally, state sovereign
immunity need not be raised and policed sua sponte by a federal court.194
One way to reconcile these features of sovereign immunity is to say that
the doctrine is not jurisdictional. That characterization, which I have explored
elsewhere,195 has some appeal because it reflects the modern idea of
jurisdiction as separate, unique, and unalloyed. But it creates tension with the
text of the Eleventh Amendment and with court precedent.196
As the taxonomy shows, the availability of jurisdictional hybridization
opens up other options. Perhaps sovereign immunity could be jurisdictional
despite having nonjurisdictional features, such as waivability. One view would
190. Compare Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1657–58 (2011) (“For over a century now,
this Court has consistently made clear that federal jurisdiction over suits against unconsenting States
was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the United States.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted), and Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 320 (1934) (stating that
state sovereign immunity is a restriction on jurisdiction), with Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677–
78 (1974) (stating that state sovereign immunity “sufficiently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional
bar”), and Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267 (1997) (calling it “a sovereign
immunity from suit, rather than a nonwaivable limit on the Judiciary’s subject-matter jurisdiction”); cf.
United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 513–15 (1940) (holding a judgment entered
against the United States without its consent to be void for lack of jurisdiction under federal sovereign
immunity).
191. See, e.g., Bradford C. Clark, The Eleventh Amendment and the Nature of the Union, 123
HARV. L. REV. 1817, 1833 (2010) (“Similarly, the Amendment is framed as a restriction on ‘[t]he
Judicial power’ and therefore limits all forms of jurisdiction recognized by Article III.”). For an
argument that some facets of state sovereign immunity are components of personal jurisdiction, see
Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1559
(2002) (characterizing Eleventh Amendment immunity as subject-matter jurisdiction and residual
sovereign immunity as personal jurisdiction). For a characterization of federal sovereign immunity as a
“jurisdictional defense,” see Hydrogen Tech. Corp. v. United States, 831 F.2d 1155, 1162 n.6 (1st Cir.
1987).
192. See Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883) (“The immunity from suit belonging to a
State . . . is a personal privilege which it may waive at pleasure . . . .”); see also Sossamon, 131 S. Ct. at
1658 (“A State, however, may choose to waive its immunity in federal court at its pleasure.”); Lapides
v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 620 (2002) (holding that a state’s voluntary
removal to federal court waives Eleventh Amendment immunity).
193. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908) (allowing such a suit); see also
Fitzgerald, supra note 70, at 1210–11 (exploring the jurisdictional basis of the Young exception). Some
theorize Young as a component of immunity rather than an exception to it, but that is not the way the
current Court views it. Compare Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign
Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1, 28 (1963), with Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct.
1632, 1642 (2011) (calling the Young doctrine an “exception” to state sovereign immunity).
194. See Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 394 (1988) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(stating that “courts need not raise the issue sua sponte”); Dodson, supra note 7, at 28–29 (explaining
why state sovereign immunity need not be policed sua sponte).
195. See Dodson, supra note 7, at 19–28.
196. See supra note 190.
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be to categorize sovereign immunity as an inherent incorporation doctrine—
much like personal jurisdiction. Under this formulation, sovereign immunity is
jurisdictional, but the concept of its jurisdictional stature has been broadened to
include nonjurisdictional features attendant to it. Sovereign immunity, then,
along with personal jurisdiction,197 could be considered a true hybrid—a
jurisdictional doctrine with nonjurisdictional features. Although that may seem
strange, the taxonomy suggests that there is a place for such a creature.
Another way to characterize sovereign immunity under the taxonomy
would be as a jurisdictional doctrine that contains a precondition—the
precondition being a proper invocation of immunity by the state entity. In other
words, the question of sovereign immunity is not reached unless the state has
properly invoked it. Proper invocation, however, could be subject to
nonjurisdictional considerations such as waiver or consent. A state’s failure to
properly invoke immunity thus would result in the jurisdictional question never
being reached.
The point is not to resolve the characterization of state sovereign
immunity definitively but rather to use the taxonomy to explore its
characterization possibilities—and their capacities to reconcile the tensions
within the doctrine—in greater depth. I am now on the record as proposing
three different ways to characterize state sovereign immunity, and so no doubt
others will chastise me for failing to come to some resolution on it. But getting
to a resolution myself has never been my goal. I mean only to offer new ways
of conceptualizing this difficult doctrine so that those who must settle on a
characterization have a variety of conceptual frameworks to aid in doing so.
B. Mootness
The Supreme Court has linked the doctrine of standing to Article III’s
case-and-controversy requirement in a way that characterizes standing as
jurisdictional.198 Although the Court has been less clear about the doctrine of
mootness,199 the prevailing view is that mootness also is linked to Article III’s
197. The parallels between the two, at least outside the context of the literal text of the
Eleventh Amendment, are striking. See Schacht, 524 U.S. at 394 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(recognizing that “the immunity bears substantial similarity to personal jurisdiction requirements”);
Nelson, supra note 191 (arguing that non-Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity is a doctrine
of personal jurisdiction).
198. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004). Note that
prudential components of the doctrine, even if not part of Article III’s requirements, might still be
characterized as jurisdictional. See id. at 11–12 (calling them “judicially self-imposed limits on the
exercise of federal jurisdiction” (citation omitted)); cf. infra text accompanying notes 214–228
(making a similar argument for abstention doctrines). For the definitive exposition of the standing,
mootness, and ripeness doctrines, see FALLON ET AL., supra note 101, at 100–22.
199. The Court has been somewhat clearer that ripeness is a jurisdictional component of
Article III’s ban on advisory opinions. See, e.g., Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442
U.S. 289, 297 (1979); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 82 (1978). But
see Meridian Sec. Ins. Co. v. Sadowski, 441 F.3d 536, 538 (7th Cir. 2006) (claiming that ripeness is
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jurisdictional requirements. In the 1964 case Liner v. Jafco, Inc., the Court
stated, “Our lack of jurisdiction to review moot cases derives from the
requirement of Article III of the Constitution under which the exercise of
judicial power depends upon the existence of a case or controversy.”200 Though
dictum, the sentiment largely has been followed in both the Supreme Court and
the lower courts.201
The difficulty with a jurisdictional characterization is that the Court also
has recognized three prudential exceptions to the doctrine that are neither found
in Article III nor even related to the values underlying the doctrine: the
“capable of repetition yet evading review,” “voluntary cessation,” and classaction exceptions.202 The very existence of these exceptions clashes with a
simple but powerful syllogism: jurisdictional doctrines admit to no judicially
created exceptions. Mootness is a jurisdictional doctrine. Therefore, no
exceptions should be allowed.203
The tension between the jurisdictional stature of mootness and its
judicially created exceptions has caused commentators to criticize the doctrine
as “lack[ing] a coherent theoretical foundation”204 and “incomprehensible.”205
Even Supreme Court Justices have leveled criticism on this basis.206 The result
is that the Court has settled, as it has with sovereign immunity, into an

not a limit on subject-matter jurisdiction); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 153, 167 (1987) (arguing normatively against a jurisdictional characterization).
200. 375 U.S. 301, 306 n.3 (1964).
201. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317–18 & n.5 (1988) (considering a mootness argument
not raised by any party and for the first time on appeal); Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998)
(“This case-or-controversy requirement subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings . . . .
The parties must continue to have a ‘personal stake in the outcome’ of the lawsuit.”) (citation omitted);
Matthew I. Hall, The Partially Prudential Doctrine of Mootness, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 562, 573 &
n.49 (2009) (detailing the precedent); Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The
Example of Mootness, 105 HARV. L. REV. 603, 612 (1992) (explaining that the Liner dictum “was
broadly accepted in subsequent Supreme Court opinions”).
202. Hall, supra note 201, at 576–77. The Supreme Court has routinely characterized these as
“exceptions” to mootness, though it has been clearer about the characterization of the “capable of
repetition but evading review” exception than about the “voluntary cessation” and class actions
exceptions. See, e.g., United States v. Juvenile Male, 131 S. Ct. 2860, 2865 (2011) (reaffirming the
characterization of the “capable of repetition but evading review” doctrine as an “established exception
to mootness”); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189–93
(2000) (discussing “the long-recognized exceptions to mootness”). For a thorough review of these
exceptions, see FALLON ET AL., supra note 101, at 189–91.
203. Erwin Chemerinsky, A Unified Approach to Justiciability, 22 CONN. L. REV. 677, 692
(1990) (“If mootness is an article III requirement, then how can the Court create broad exceptions
based on the desire to facilitate judicial review . . . ?”); Hall, supra note 201, at 562–64, 584–85
(making the same point).
204. Hall, supra note 201, at 562.
205. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist
Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 490 (1996).
206. Honig, 484 U.S. at 330 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty,
445 U.S. 388, 411 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“Since the question is one of power, the practical
importance of review cannot control.”).
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unsatisfying characterization of mootness as a “flexible” doctrine207 that
“derives from” the Article III case-and-controversy requirement.208
Others have tried to reconcile the jurisdictionality of the mootness
doctrine with its exceptions by recharacterizing the mootness doctrine (or parts
of it) as nonjurisdictional.209 My theory of hybridization suggests another way,
which begins by challenging the syllogism’s major premise that jurisdictional
doctrines admit to no judicially created exceptions. If I am right, then mootness
and its exceptions could be reconciled through hybridization, resulting in a
uniform and more coherent doctrine.
For example, one could conceive of mootness and its prudential
exceptions as a form of incorporated hybridization. Mootness is a jurisdictional
requirement, but it expressly incorporates into its contours some prudential
considerations, including the exceptions developed by the Court. Under this
conceptualization, the exceptions do not allow the court to hear a moot case but
rather are part of the definition of mootness itself. The voluntary-cessation
principle is a prime illustration of this hybridization: if conduct is voluntarily
ceased, the case is simply not moot as a definitional matter.210 Such an
explanation suggests that the much-maligned flexible characterization of
mootness may be exactly right—if only the conceptualization of
jurisdictionality is broadened to include such flexibility in its contours.
Or perhaps the jurisdictional limit underlying mootness is controlled
timing-wise by a trigger, a consideration that parallels Henry Monaghan’s
famous assertion that mootness is “the doctrine of standing set in a time
frame.”211 The timing rule for the Article III determination is the inverse of the
statutory-jurisdiction determination. Unlike the time-of-invocation rule,212 the
usual Article III rule is that standing must exist at all stages of review “and not
simply at the date the action is initiated.”213 But if—like the time-of-invocation
rule for statutory jurisdiction—the timing rule for justiciability is
nonjurisdictional, then it could be shifted or changed for prudential reasons.
This would mean that standing would only need to exist at certain points in the

207. Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 398–401.
208. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974).
209. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 201 (arguing that the exceptions apply to the “prudential”
component of the mootness doctrine rather than the component grounded in Article III); Lee, supra
note 201, at 654–68 (arguing for wholesale deconstitutionalization of mootness); Pushaw, supra note
205, at 490–93 (same). I am sympathetic to these arguments.
210. There is some support for this definitional characterization in the cases. See, e.g., United
States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953) (stating that voluntary cessation “does not make
the case moot”).
211. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J.
1363, 1384 (1973). I am aware that the Court disclaimed this description of mootness in Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190 (2000).
212. See supra text accompanying notes 124–134.
213. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973); see also U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner
Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 21 (1994) (“[A] case must exist at all the stages of appellate review.”).
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litigation, and those points could be set based on nonjurisdictional
considerations. If, for example, the capable-of-repetition-but-evading-review
principle applies, then it would apply not as an exception to the jurisdictional
doctrine itself but rather to the nonjurisdictional timing rule that Article III
requirements must be determined at all stages. In such a case, if the plaintiff
had standing and the case was not moot at the time of filing, then Article III
was satisfied at the time of invocation. As in other jurisdictional contexts,
subsequent events, such as the elimination of the plaintiff’s interest, would
become irrelevant to the jurisdictional determination.
Again, the point is not to determine whether or what hybridization is
correct; rather, the point is to focus attention on the availability of hybridization
as a mechanism for resolving the internal tensions of the mootness doctrine.
C. Discretionary Declines of Jurisdiction
The supplemental-jurisdiction statute allows a court to decline to exercise
claims over which it admittedly has supplemental jurisdiction if, in the
discretion of the court, jurisdiction is not warranted.214 It also allows a court to
retain supplemental jurisdiction claims for adjudication on the merits even after
the dismissal of all anchor claims that gave rise to federal jurisdiction in the
first place.215 For example, in a case that presents both federal and state claims,
if the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the federal claims, the district court could,
in its discretion, keep the state claims even if the parties were non-diverse. The
Supreme Court has held these statutory authorizations to be constitutional
under Article III.216 A number of jurisdictional-hybridization issues arise from
these circumstances.217
The first issue is whether the discretionary decline of supplemental
jurisdiction is itself jurisdictional. In Carlsbad Technologies, Inc. v. HIF Bio,
Inc., plaintiffs filed a patent lawsuit in state court, alleging violations of state
and federal law. The defendant removed the entire case to federal district court.
Thereafter, the district court dismissed the only federal claim in the lawsuit for
failure to state a claim, and it declined, pursuant to the statute,218 to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. Accordingly, the
district court remanded the state-law claims back to state court.
The plaintiff appealed the remand order, arguing that the district court
should have exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims
because they implicated federal patent-law rights. The court of appeals
214. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2006) (setting out guidance for the exercise of such discretion).
215. Id.
216. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350–51 (1988) (holding pendent
claims constitutional).
217. A related doctrine with similar implications is the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction,
which the Court has treated as discretionary. See Shapiro, supra note 105, at 561.
218. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
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dismissed the appeal, finding that the remand order could be colorably
characterized as a remand based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and,
therefore, barred from review under § 1447(d).219
The Supreme Court held that a remand order based on a discretionary
decline of supplemental jurisdiction was not a remand “for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction” under the removal statute.220 The Court reasoned that the
discretionary decline of supplemental jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional
matter.221 It analogized to remands based on abstention doctrines, which the
Court also had held not to be “for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.”222 In
essence, Carlsbad viewed discretion to decline jurisdiction as a separate,
nonjurisdictional override of the jurisdictional grant. Under the Court’s view,
jurisdiction exists only according to the grant and its jurisdictional exclusions,
not according to any exercise of discretion. The discretionary decline of
supplemental jurisdiction would then be a nonjurisdictional remand of a case
over which the court nevertheless has and continues to have jurisdiction.
Carlsbad may have reached the right result in characterizing the court’s
exercise of discretion as nonjurisdictional.223 For my purposes here, I am
agnostic on that question. I only note that using my taxonomy might have led to
the conclusion that the exercise of discretion was, in fact, jurisdictional. Two
potential hybridizations explain how.
The first possibility is viewing discretion as incorporated into the
jurisdictional determination in a manner similar to the statutory incorporation
of “good cause” in § 2107(c). The exercise of judicial discretion enables a court
to shift the boundaries of its jurisdiction by using nonjurisdictional considerations, but the result is a jurisdictional decision. The nonjurisdictional feature of
judicial discretion is part and parcel of the jurisdictional boundary, such that the

219. Carlsbad Techs., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1862, 1863–65 (2009).
220. Id. at 1864–65. The Court previously had held that a district court may remand, rather
than dismiss, supplemental jurisdiction claims that had been removed from state court to federal court.
See Cohill, 484 U.S. at 357.
221. Carlsbad, 129 S. Ct. at 1867. The Court thus held the remand order appealable despite
§ 1447(d)’s bar on such review. The appealability of remand orders at issue in Carlsbad has generated
significant controversy. For a review of that controversy and the powerful argument that mandamus
should be used to review remand orders rather than exceptions to § 1447(d), see James E. Pfander,
Collateral Review of Remand Orders: Reasserting the Supervisory Role of the Supreme Court, 159 U.
PA. L. REV. 493 (2011).
222. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 711–12 (1996). Abstention doctrines
allow federal courts to decline to exercise jurisdiction for a variety of reasons, many of which are
within their discretion. See Shapiro, supra note 105, at 574–88. I note that Class Action Fairness Act
(CAFA) jurisdiction has a similar discretionary provision. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3) (providing that a
district court “may, in the interests of justice and looking at the totality of the circumstances, decline to
exercise jurisdiction” over certain class actions).
223. Or, perhaps, Carlsbad meant to say only that a discretionary decline of supplemental
jurisdiction under § 1367(c) is nonjurisdictional only for purposes of the appealability of remand
orders under § 1447(d) while leaving open the possibility that it is jurisdictional for other purposes,
such as a dismissal in a case originally filed in federal court.
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discretionary decision to decline jurisdiction withdraws jurisdiction, while the
discretionary decision to exercise jurisdiction establishes it.
Carlsbad overlooked this possibility by assuming that the exercise of
discretion could never be jurisdictional.224 But hybridization allows
jurisdictional doctrines to incorporate discretion. The exercise of discretion
may shift the jurisdictional line, but it still results in a jurisdictional ruling.
Carlsbad at least should have entertained the possibility that supplemental
jurisdiction could incorporate discretion instead of assuming that discretion is
anathema to jurisdiction.
The second possible hybridization employs a trigger shift. Carlsbad
involved non-diverse, private parties litigating a federal claim and several state
claims at the time of removal. Later, the court dismissed the only federal claim
and declined to retain supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state
claims.225 Under normal operation of the time-of-invocation trigger, the
jurisdictional assessment occurred at the time of invocation and fixed the
jurisdictional determination before the dismissal of the federal claim. Although
the district court had jurisdiction to consider the remaining state-law claims, the
supplemental-jurisdiction considerations of “judicial economy, convenience
and fairness to litigants” overrode that jurisdiction.226 Thinking about
supplemental jurisdiction in this way causes the anomaly of basing jurisdiction
upon these nonjurisdictional considerations. But because the time-of-invocation
rule is nonjurisdictional, it could be shifted to the time that the court exercises
its discretion under § 1367(c). And, conveniently, the considerations for
shifting the time-of-invocation rule are quite similar to those for exercising
discretion under supplemental jurisdiction.227 If the time-of-invocation rule
shifts to the time of discretion, then the jurisdictional determination would be
made anew based on circumstances existing in the case at that time—when the
federal claim has been dismissed and no basis for federal jurisdiction remains.
The result is that the time-of-invocation rule stays with the determination of
jurisdiction, and any resulting decision on jurisdiction is itself jurisdictional.
D. Various Statutory Preconditions
The taxonomy recognizes that preconditions to jurisdiction need not
themselves be jurisdictional. This helps explain a number of other doctrines.
One obvious possibility is the need for effective service of process before

224. Carlsbad, 129 S. Ct. at 1867 (reasoning that because the declination is discretionary, it is
nonjurisdictional).
225. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
226. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)
(setting out bases for discretionary decline of jurisdiction).
227. Compare Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726 (encouraging consideration of “judicial economy,
convenience and fairness to litigants”), with Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 75 (1996) (shifting
the time-of-invocation rule for reasons of “finality, efficiency, and economy”).
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personal jurisdiction will attach. Service could be thought of as a precondition
to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant, but service itself is
nonjurisdictional.228 Other nonjurisdictional preconditions might include the
presentation requirement in the Social Security Act,229 the need to obtain a
right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission before
filing a Title VII action,230 and the requirement that a tax-refund applicant
timely pay his entire assessed deficiency in full.231 Note that the curability of
noncompliance with a precondition does not make it any less of a precondition;
as the taxonomy acknowledges, timing rules may also be employed as
nonjurisdictional features, such that the curing of a precondition can be thought
of as a nonjurisdictional time shift for satisfying the precondition.
IV.
A NORMATIVE PICTURE
The previous Parts provided a theoretical account of jurisdictional
hybridization and explored analytically some of its effects on current doctrine.
This Part sketches out the normative picture for jurisdictional hybridization.
A. The Benefit of Jurisdictional Regulation
Jurisdictional hybridization enables jurisdictional regulation. Linking
jurisdictionality with nonjurisdictionality allows more court and party control
of jurisdictional issues, questions, and contours. That, in turn, has several
benefits. Court control and discretion permit greater consideration of those
features—equity, discretion, efficiency, and economy—that jurisdictionality
eschews. Party control may mitigate some of the costs of jurisdiction by
allowing the parties to select only those issues that warrant litigation. In short,
if equity or discretion ought to be applied but for a characterization of
jurisdictionality, jurisdictionality ought to be limited.
In that vein, reconsider Bowles, in which the Court rejected a habeas
petition that was timely under the lower court’s timeline but was untimely
under the governing statute. No one disputes the gross unfairness to Bowles
when he relied on the erroneous district-court order to his detriment. If not for
the jurisdictional characterization, he would have been excused from his
noncompliance and entitled to an appeal. The problem for Bowles was the

228. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h) (deeming waivable objections to service); id.
12(a)(1)(A)(ii) (deeming service waivable).
229. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328–30 (1976) (characterizing it as a
jurisdictional precondition).
230. See Perdue v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp., 690 F.2d 1091, 1093 (4th Cir. 1982) (discussing
the precondition).
231. See 28 U.S.C. § 7422 (setting out the requirements for filing an action for a refund);
United States v. Baggot, 463 U.S. 476, 478–79 (1983) (interpreting the statute to require prepayment
of the assessment).
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characterization of the deadline as jurisdictional. The dissent in Bowles argued
that that characterization ought not control, but the taxonomy provides an
alternative answer. Under a hybridization theory, the deadline can be
jurisdictional, but that jurisdictionality is regulated by the equity of the
circumstances. Much as Justice Black would have held in Teague, the statute
could be read to implicitly incorporate considerations of equity and discretion.
The majority might still be correct that the thirty-day deadline is jurisdictional,
but equity and discretion might help determine when that deadline has been
met.232 In other words, both the jurisdictional stature of the deadline and the
exceptional circumstances doctrine might live together in harmony.
One additional nuance above and beyond Bowles is that the hybridization
of jurisdictional doctrines with nonjurisdictional rules does not mean that those
nonjurisdictional rules have only nonjurisdictional effects. As mentioned earlier
in this Article, nonjurisdictional rules can have jurisdictional effects,233 and
there might be good reasons why nonjurisdictional controls of jurisdiction
should themselves have some jurisdictional effects. Waivability, for example, is
a product of catering to the adversary system, and there may be good reason not
to cater so much to the adversary system on matters of jurisdiction.234 Thus, for
example, a nonjurisdictional timing rule may be subject to judicial discretion
yet also be immune from party waiver or consent. The point is not to eliminate
jurisdictional features and effects from jurisdictional rules; the point is to free
them from the confines of the jurisdictional-nonjurisdictional dichotomy so that
they can be mixed and matched in a way that best fits the particular rule and
circumstances at hand.
In this regard, I do not mean to suggest that my taxonomy manifests levels
of preference for setting that optimal hybridization. Perhaps incorporated
hybridization regulates jurisdiction most effectively and appropriately in one
set of circumstances, while indirect hybridization does so in a different set of
circumstances. My purpose in setting out the taxonomy is merely to show the
options that exist for hybridization and that, as a whole, they have value.
Hybridization, no doubt, incurs countervailing costs. A dichotomy is
simple, easy to understand, and relatively easy to categorize in most cases.

232. For a similar argument, see Perry Dane, Sad Time: Thoughts on Jurisdictionality, the
Legal Imagination, and Bowles v. Russell, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 164, 167–68 (2008),
http://colloquy.law.northwestern.edu/main/2008/01/sad-time-though.html.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 46–58.
234. See Hall, supra note 135, at 419 (“[I]f a procedural rule protects interests larger than those
of the immediate parties, if there are greater societal concerns at stake, then waiver may not be
appropriate. In such cases, the immediate parties’ cognizance of the error is not an adequate proxy for
the degree of societal harm. The interests that are prejudiced by the defect may outweigh the harms to
judicial efficiency caused by delay in raising the defect.”); cf. Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to
Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 379–83 (1942) (making
the analogical point that the waivability of evidentiary objections or admissions ought not apply in
non-adversarial administrative proceedings).
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Hybridization complicates things. But as a descriptive matter, jurisdictional
complexity exists, whether we like it or not. One would have to turn a blind eye
to reality to adhere to the dichotomy and suffer the resulting costs of inaccuracy
and doctrinal confusion. And jurisdictional complexity, despite its costs, has
some great virtues, which I have explored elsewhere.235
At bottom, the normative argument is a complicated one. It likely turns on
the circumstances and may ultimately depend upon empirical assessments. I
suspect that hybridization will have great benefits in some areas and perhaps
fewer benefits in others. More study must be done to sort the normative
questions out, and, rather than do that here, I simply sketch out the normative
picture and leave it to future projects to flesh that picture out in concrete
circumstances.
But there is an important payoff that ought to be embraced: the acceptance
of hybridization as an option. Without hybridization, jurisdictionality is always
rigid, isolated, and costly. It is also, at least in some of the examples I have laid
out, in tension with itself. With hybridization as an option, perhaps those costs
and tensions can be mitigated profitably. At the very least, hybridization gives
courts and legislatures a fuller range of options for crafting the most
appropriate rule, with the most appropriate effects, for the particular
circumstances it governs.
B. The Benefit of Jurisdictional Solidarity
At the same time that hybridization softens the harshness of jurisdiction,
hybridization reaffirms it. As Evan Lee has forcefully argued:
[B]anishing the term “jurisdiction” from our legal lexicon is out of the
question. Centuries of Anglo-American jurisprudence are built upon
the notion that something called “jurisdiction” is a predicate for
moving forward in adjudication. Equally importantly, eliminating the
doctrines of jurisdiction would be extremely disruptive to, and
inefficient for, the administration of justice.236
In addition, jurisdiction has a structural role to play in determining the scope of
authority of law-speaking institutions, particularly when a case passes from one
to another.237 It performs an expressive role in affirming that certain limitations
are important or fundamental. And it has the psychological boon of allowing, in
235. See generally Dodson, supra note 143.
236. Lee, supra note 19, at 1628; see also Dane, supra note 232, at 166 (“[A] fundamental
postulate of the idea of jurisdiction, as a classical feature of our legal culture, is that jurisdictionality is
more than just a label for certain consequences. If a rule is jurisdictional, it really does implicate the
authority of a court.”).
237. See Alex Lees, Note, The Jurisdictional Label: Use and Misuse, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1457,
1460 (2006) (“I argue that if a rule operates to shift authority from one law-speaking institution to
another in the case of compliance, and is premised on a policy decision that compliance makes that
institution more proper for resolution of law than another, then the rule can justifiably be treated
rigidly.”).
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some circumstances, a judge to wash his or her hands of the issue, even if the
rule leads to harsh or unjust results. In short, although it has its costs,
jurisdiction has its benefits too.
My theory of hybridization retains these virtues. Hybridization regulates
and narrows jurisdiction but does not eviscerate it. To the contrary, it reaffirms
its importance. Hybridization is both conjoining and defining. It allows
jurisdictionality to combine with nonjurisdictionality, but, at the same time, it
reinforces what is and is not jurisdictional by forcing detailed consideration of
the characterization of various components of the rule.
To illustrate, consider sovereign immunity. Without hybridization,
sovereign immunity is difficult—perhaps impossible—to characterize as
jurisdictional because it can be waived or consented to. These nonjurisdictional
characteristics inhibit any attempt to classify sovereign immunity as an
unalloyed jurisdictional doctrine.
Hybridization, however, permits a jurisdictional characterization of
sovereign immunity by reconciling the tension. Opening the doctrine up to
hybridization exposes the waiver component as a nonjurisdictional feature of
(whether incorporated in or linked to) the jurisdictional doctrine as a unit. By
dissociating troublesome features, calling them what they are, and then
rejoining them under the hybridization theory, nonjurisdictionality and
jurisdictionality coexist, with a clearer picture of each. The concept of
jurisdiction, its expressive function, and its structural role thus all remain intact.
Further, my theory of hybridization can help reconcile apparent conflicts
between the nature of jurisdiction and the availability of judicial discretion.
Professor Fred Bloom, for example, has argued that jurisdiction is a “lie”
because although it purports to be inflexible and rigid, courts regularly exercise
discretion over its boundaries.238 My theory takes a somewhat different view.
The conventional understanding of jurisdiction as special and unique may be a
lie, but revealing that truth should help assuage Bloom’s concerns.
The timing rules of Caterpillar, which allow nonjurisdictional
considerations to shift the determination of jurisdiction from the time of
invocation to the time of final judgment, provide an illustration. Bloom argues
that Caterpillar used considerations of efficiency and economy to adjust
diversity jurisdiction.239 That would be true if the time-of-invocation rule were
itself jurisdictional. But it is not. The time-of-invocation rule is linked to
subject-matter jurisdiction, but it is itself nonjurisdictional. Thus, the efficiency
and economy concerns in Caterpillar applied only to overcome a
nonjurisdictional defect, something permissible even under the traditional
conceptualization of jurisdiction.

238. Bloom, supra note 105, at 1004.
239. Id. (“But cost and convenience—like weight and expedience—are not part of diversity’s
calculation.”).
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CONCLUSION
Jurisdiction needs a new vision. It is not so separate and unique as its
recent history supposes. And it is not as binary as many seem to think. Perhaps
jurisdiction is akin to property—with a bundle of consequences.240 Whatever its
meta-theory, jurisdiction is a doctrine that is subject to various considerations
that are not captured by a dichotomy. Indeed, it can be hybridized with
nonjurisdictional features and considerations in a host of different ways.
Hybridization has benefits. It offers new ways of conceptualizing difficult
doctrines. Sovereign immunity, mootness, and discretionary declines of
jurisdiction all illustrate the struggle to use a rigid dichotomy to capture
nuance. Hybridization provides a way out that allows for more sensible and
useful conceptualizations. Hybridization also enables regulation of jurisdiction
in ways that can be beneficial to parties and to the judicial system as a whole by
limiting the high costs of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, then, can be harnessed both
to minimize its costs and maximize its advantages.
Part of the challenge in re-envisioning jurisdictionality will be to create a
new lexicon to describe hybridization’s effects. Because the modern
conceptualizations of jurisdictionality and nonjurisdictionality are antipodally
defined, hybridization requires a new terminology to communicate blended
rules. “Nonjurisdictional” no longer means having a defined set of functional
effects. Likewise, something “jurisdictional” that is hybridized with
nonjurisdictional features loses some of its definitional power.
I am not convinced that the terms are worthless, however. They may
operate at a more diffuse level of specificity, but that does not mean that such
labels should be discarded. As argued in Part IV, the term “jurisdiction” may
still have powerful structural, expressive, and psychological roles to play even
when divorced from a set of functional effects. What are needed, however, are
additional labels for the specific hybrids at hand. I have named some here, but
there are countless others to explore. I suspect (and hope) that those monikers
will come as the use of the hybrids becomes more accepted.

240.

I owe this insightful rumination to Professor Evan Tsen Lee.

